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Memory is crucial for guiding animals as to where, when and on what to forage, whom 
to mate with and how to detect and evade predators. The contents of memory can 
change over time; either passively, where details are forgotten, or by reactivating and 
consolidating memories, in which previously stored and new information effect the final 
memory. In humans the fallibility of memory is well studied, with many errors known 
to effect declarative memory. However, little is known about the potential occurrence of 
such memory errors in non-human animals. In this thesis I investigate how memory 
changes over time using key model organisms of memory; the bumblebee and the 
honeybee. Additionally, I explore errors in human memory. 
 
In Chapter two I explore memory degradation for colour patterns over time in 
bumblebees. I find no difference in memory decay if patterns are symmetrical around a 
vertical axis (an arrangement innately preferred) or not. However, not all information is 
forgotten over time: information about the colour contained in the pattern is retained, 
whilst the details of the overall configuration of the target flower are lost. In Chapter 
three I show for the first time in a non-human animal ‘merging’ of long-term memories. 
Bumblebees trained to two artificial flower types show a preference for a previously 
unseen hybrid of the two. This is similar to the memory conjunction error shown by 
humans. In Chapter four I find no biasing effect of postevent cues, akin to the 
misinformation effect in humans, in either bumblebees or honeybees. However I note 
the methodological difficulties in examining this type of memory error in an insect 
model. Finally, in Chapter five I look at a known error in human memory and show how 
semantic false memories may be an inevitable by-product of the adaptive cognitive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The fallibility of human memory 
1.11 In the beginning: The misinformation effect and the DRM paradigm   
Human memory, for all its intricacies and adaptive processes that enable us to function 
efficiently in our daily lives, is surprisingly fallible. After the seminal first formal 
exploration of false memories (Bartlett, 1932), research progressed relatively slowly, 
and some important findings were overlooked at the time of discovery, for example the 
demonstration that false recollections in a wordlist learning paradigm are due to the 
associations between the words in the lists and those falsely recalled (Deese, 1959). For 
much of the 20
th
 century, research into memory failure focused on the effects of 
interference, i.e. cases when memories compete for representational space, and thus 
interfere with one other (Keppel and Underwood, 1962, Müller and Pilzecker, 1900, 
Tulving and Arbuckle, 1966). But it was not until the 1970s when a plethora of studies 
based on the effect of misleading information, inspired by the ‘leading question law’ in 
the judicial system, that the formal discovery and labelling of the ‘misinformation 
effect’ occurred and the field of false memory research expanded rapidly (Loftus and 
Palmer, 1974, Loftus, 2005). 
 
Declarative memory is people’s consciously accessible memory for facts and events 
(Squire et al., 1993) and this is the memory system that false memory research probes. 
Declarative memory is sub-divided into two further memory types: semantic memory 
and episodic memory (Squire et al., 1993). Semantic memory is our general knowledge 
about the world, more specifically factual information, for example dates of important 
historical events, or chemical symbols (Colman, 2009, Tulving et al., 1972). Semantic 
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memory does not include personal episodes and the spatial and temporal information 
among them (Colman, 2009, Tulving et al., 1972). Episodic memory can be considered 
as our autobiographical memory, covering our personal experiences of events, for 
example getting married three years ago or having cereal for breakfast this morning 
(Colman, 2009). Episodic memory includes the spatial and temporal aspects of these 
personally experienced events (Tulving et al., 1972). The two most commonly used 
methodologies for studying false memory each deal with one of these.   
 
Studies into episodic false memory use the ‘misinformation paradigm’. In this 
paradigm, information given after an event, or the way in which a question is asked can 
mislead, with memory being biased in the direction of the information (Loftus, 2005). 
Memory can be distorted for just small parts or specific features of events (Loftus and 
Palmer, 1974, Loftus, 1975), or entire events (Bernstein et al., 2005, Loftus and 
Pickrell, 1995), which are termed ‘rich’ false memories. The false memories produced 
are episodic, as participants can often not only ‘remember’ the event occurring in their 
life, but also when and where it occurred, with a mental reliving of it upon 
‘remembering’ (Braun et al., 2002, Ost et al., 2005).  
 
Semantic false memory is often studied using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm (Deese, 1959, Roediger and McDermott, 1995). In this type of experiment, 
participants are required to study lists of words each composed of associates of one non-
presented word. During subsequent recall and/or recognition participants ‘remember’ 
the non-presented words both with high frequency and high confidence levels (Roediger 
and McDermott, 1995, Stadler et al., 1999). Thus, semantic false memories are elicited. 
The creation of these false memories is ascribed to the strength of the associations 
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between the words presented in the lists and those falsely remembered, i.e. the non-
presented words (Deese, 1959). 
 
Whilst episodic and semantic false memories are elicited using different techniques, 
they are often not distinguished in the literature, with all incorrect recalls and/or 
recognitions simply termed ‘false memories’, regardless of the testing paradigm used or 
type of memory they refer to.  
 
1.12 A new classification: The seven ‘sins’ of memory 
More recently Schacter (1999) re-classified the known transgressions of human memory 
into seven distinct types, labelling them ‘sins’, akin to the seven deadly sins present in 
the bible. The first three ‘sins’: ‘transience’, ‘absentmindedness’ and ‘blocking’ are 
placed within the subdivision ‘sins of omission’, which can more simply be viewed as 
types of forgetting (Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 2001). ‘Transience’ describes the general 
process of memory weakening or loss over time, often generically called ‘forgetting’, 
whilst ‘absentmindedness’ specifically portrays lapses in attention at either encoding or 
retrieval, which results in either a failure to remember information that was never 
encoded, or the act of overlooking the information when trying to retrieve it, one 
example being misplacing one’s car keys (Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 2001). Conversely, 
‘blocking’ entails the inability to retrieve information despite a high level of attention, 
the most common example being the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon (Schacter, 1999, 




The final four ‘sins’: ‘misattribution’, ‘suggestibility’, ‘bias’ and ‘persistence’ are 
placed within the subdivision ‘sins of commission’, the first three of which can more 
simply be viewed as types of distortion (Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 2001). 
‘Misattribution’ is where memories are attributed to the wrong source, for example 
mistakenly confusing something read in a book with a real life occurrence (Schacter, 
1999, Schacter, 2001). The semantic false memories elicited by the DRM paradigm and 
described above fall under this label. With ‘suggestibility’ misleading information from 
external sources is incorporated into personal recollections; this is the classification into 
which the above described episodic false memories fall (Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 
2001). ‘Bias’ describes the influence of our own knowledge and experiences on 
memory. For example, our current beliefs can distort our memory for past events, such 
that they are realigned with our current attitudes about the world (Schacter, 2001). 
Finally, ‘persistence’ describes repeated intrusive recollections, most commonly this is 
seen in the inability to forget a traumatic or emotionally negative experience (Schacter, 
1999). 
 
1.13 Memory error: An adaptive perspective? 
Further to this novel classification system, Schacter (1999) proposed that whilst these 
‘sins’ are generally viewed as negative errors, they should in fact be viewed as 
potentially inevitable by-products of the many adaptive features of human memory. 
Schacter (1999, 2001) is not the first to propose such an explanation. Many scholars 
have long argued that forgetting (known as ‘transience’ in the seven sins) could actually 
be adaptive in itself. Anderson and Schooler (1991) proposed that human memory is 
adapted to environmental structure, such that memories are variable in their current 
need, with a system that attempts to optimise itself, and thus the most relevant 
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memories are made available, with past history used to assess whether a memory is 
currently needed. Bjork and Bjork (1988) further argued that our ability to efficiently 
retrieve information currently relevant is aided by the fact that we lose access to 
information no longer required. Therefore, in their view it is this plasticity of memory 
retention that enables us to successfully adapt to a changing environment. Similarly 
with ‘absent-mindedness’, our ability to function at an abstract level, induced by the 
non-coding of the details of certain items, enables us to perform routine activities on 
‘autopilot’ (Schacter, 2001). As such we can better attend to things we consider more 
important, but the result is that we sometimes fail to encode important information. A 
prime example of the consequence of the failure of this adaptive feature of memory can 
be found in the famous study of the Russian journalist and mnemonist Solomon 
Shereshevski (Luria, 1968). Shereshevski encoded every fact, figure and experience he 
encountered with absolute detail, but yet could not grasp abstract concepts. Likewise 
with ‘blocking’, whilst occasionally inhibitory memory processes prevent a required 
piece of information from being recalled, they primarily act to stop an overwhelming 
amount of information coming to mind whenever we try and retrieve a memory. If 
numerous memory traces of every detail of information linked to what we are trying to 
achieve are recalled at once, then confusion would reign (Bjork, 1989). 
 
‘Misattribution’ is attributed to assigning information to the incorrect source. One 
specific example is the semantic memory errors elicited using the DRM paradigm 
(Roediger and McDermott, 1995), which could be considered as the inevitable by-
product of our ability to generalise and form categories and concepts (Schacter, 1999). 
Categorising is seen as an adaptive memory process as it economises memory, allowing 
us to, rather than encode every detail about every item we encounter, recall a large 
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number of items based on just a few criteria (Chittka and Niven, 2009, Merritt et al., 
2010). However, as a result we may often falsely recognise or recall members of a 
category, which were not presented, when their exemplars were. The least is known 
about the potential cause of ‘misinformation’, in which secondary information biases an 
existing memory. As with ‘misattribution’ it is likely caused at least in part by the 
failure to attribute the memory to the correct source (Schacter, 1999). Similarly to 
‘transience’, applying Anderson and Schooler’s (1991) theory of a memory system 
adapted by the environment, we rarely need to know the specific source details of all 
memories, just the more general information pertaining to the memories. As such, it is 
easy to see how we may inadvertently ‘remember’ information given by others but 
mistakenly label it as coming from our own knowledge and subsequently combine it 
with an existing memory. ‘Bias’ comes in many forms and as such can distort memory 
in many ways. Stereotypical bias, in which memory is distorted by our stereotypes, may 
occur as a by-product of these generalisations, e.g. our ability to group people and or 
objects based on past experiences (Schacter, 2001). As stated previously, categorising is 
adaptive as it allows efficiency of memory, enabling an item to be placed correctly 
based on just a few rules rather than a large amount of very specific detail (Chittka and 
Niven, 2009). Egocentric bias is also common. This is where memories about oneself 
are distorted in order to enhance the perception of ‘the self’, for example through 
exaggerating the difficulties of past experiences to inflate the appearance of current 
achievements (Schacter, 2001). Whilst it was once thought that accurate perceptions of 
‘the self’ were crucial for maintaining mental health, Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) 
have shown that not only do people commonly exhibit what they term ‘positive 
illusions’, in which ‘the self’ is in some way viewed in a more enhanced way, but that 
these illusions can promote aspects of mental health such as the ability to be happy and 
contented. Finally with ‘persistence’, the robustness of traumatic memories as 
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controlled by the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996) may at best be an annoyance and at worst 
be hugely impactful upon everyday functioning (Brewin, 2003). However, the strong 
retention and persistent replaying of such information may be crucial if the memory is 




1.2 Memory fallibility in animal models 
1.21 Comparative cognitive neuroscience 
Our current knowledge as to the workings of human learning and memory owes in large 
part to the plethora of work with animal models undertaken over the last century. From 
classical conditioning in the dog Canis lupus familiaris (Pavlov and Anrep, 1927) to 
operant conditioning in the rat Rattus norvegicus (Skinner, 1938) and habituation 
studies with the sea slug Aplysia californica (Pinsker et al., 1970), we have learnt much 
about the behavioural and neuronal aspects of human cognition. Comparative cognitive 
neuroscience, in which animal models are utilised, in the hope of gaining a better 
understanding about aspects of the human mind, is now an extremely well established 
scientific field. Theory states that mechanisms underlying many aspects of human 
cognition are also present, potentially in a more basic form, in non-human animals, due 
to the evolutionary connection between species (Menzel, 2008). So why, given the vast 
number of studies into human memory fallibility, have so few been undertaken in non-
human animals? Firstly many of the classic human studies rely on verbal 
communication (Loftus and Palmer, 1974, Roediger and McDermott, 1995), which 
would be impossible to reproduce with non-human species. Secondly there is still some 
argument as to whether non-human animals utilise one of the key memory systems that 
humans do, which in turn prevents them from producing false memories from that 







1.22 Episodic memory in non-human animals? 
The eminent psychologist and neuroscientist Endel Tulving (2002) argues that non-
human animals are incapable of utilising episodic memory in the way that humans do. 
For him the ability to utilise episodic memory requires ‘mental time travel’; a re-
experiencing of the event when recalling it, which in turn requires both a sense of self 
and that of time passing, neither of which he argues have been widely shown to occur in 
non-human animals (Suddendorf, 2013, Tulving, 2002). This view is not universally 
shared, with much research now indicating that non-human animals can utilise a type of 
memory that involves not only specific events, but information pertaining to where and 
when they occurred. For example, Clayton and Dickinson (1998) showed that not only 
do scrub jays Aphelocoma coerulescens remember the spatial location and contents of 
food caches, but also, crucially, when the food items were cached. When both wax 
worms, which degrade over time and peanuts, which do not, were cached, jays 
preferentially recovered caches containing wax worms if they had been cached 
relatively recently, but chose not to if a long period of time had passed. Conversely jays 
preferentially recovered caches containing peanuts only after a significant period of 
time had passed. Thus jays fulfil the majority of the criteria of the ‘what’, ‘where’ and 
‘when’ definition of episodic memory. Additionally, research with a gorilla Gorilla 
gorilla gorilla (Schwartz et al., 2002, 2004) and the bottlenose dolphin Tursiops 
truncatus (Mercado et al., 1998) has shown some elements of episodic memory 
utilisation, but none of these studies truly investigated all three of the ‘what’, ‘where’ 
and ‘when’ criteria simultaneously. Furthermore as none of the non-human animal 
research proves the ‘mental time travel’ component of episodic memory has taken 




1.23 Animals and humans: Analogous results 
The relatively small amount of research into false memory that has been undertaken in 
non-human animals has shown results analogous to those seen in humans and has 
utilised the delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) paradigm: the commonly used 
methodology for investigating learning and memory in non-human animals (Blough, 
1959). In the paradigm, the subject learns to match a sample with one of two or more 
comparisons, presented after a delay. As such, the sample is no longer present at the 
decision point. Subjects are thought to utilise both working memory and long-term 
memory to successfully learn the paradigm (Blough, 1959). As such, the DMTS 
paradigm has been utilised in the study of the effect of ‘misinformation’ in non-human 
animals. The delay, given after the sample to be remembered, but before the choice test, 
allows non-verbal postevent cues to be inserted, as ‘misinformation’ as is in human 
studies. Harper and Garry (2000) reported that postevent cues bias recognition 
performance in a visual three-colour delayed matching-to sample (DMTS) task in the 
pigeon Columba livia. When pigeons were shown information after the sample that was 
consistent with the sample, and as such was consistent with the correct choice in the 
matching test, their performance was improved (above baseline). Conversely, when 
shown information after the sample that was inconsistent with the sample and as such 
was consistent with the incorrect choice in the matching test, their performance was 
hampered (below baseline) (Harper and Garry, 2000). Thus memory was biased in the 
direction of the misinformation, just as has been shown to occur in humans. They later 
furthered this work (Garry and Harper, 2009), showing that the rat is also susceptible to 
misleading information during a DMTS task involving retractable levers and light cues, 
again with performance enhanced by consistent misinformation and worsened by 
inconsistent misinformation. Furthermore human subjects were tested using a 
methodology back-translated from the pigeon and rat experiments, in which a 
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computerised DMTS task involving black and white kaleidoscope images were used. 
The result, that humans are still effected by misinformation in the same way as 
previously shown in other studies (for example Bernstein et al., 2005, Loftus and 
Palmer, 1974) provides evidence that the analogous effects of misinformation seen in 
non-human animal species are not due to the methodological differences created when 
adapting experiments for non-human subjects (Garry and Harper, 2009). 
 
Additionally Schwartz et al. (2004) reported that misinformation negatively affects 
event memory in a gorilla. After viewing either a person or an object the gorilla was 
shown misinformation in the form of a photograph depicting a different person or 
object. When then given the choice between three photographs, one showing the correct 
person or object, one showing the incorrect person or object shown in the 
misinformation and one showing a third irrelevant person or object, the gorilla’s 
selection was biased in the direction of the misinformation and as such performance was 
decreased (below baseline) (Schwartz et al., 2004). Furthermore, Kraemer and Golding 
(1997) have argued that adaptive forgetting may also occur in non-human animals. 
Although these examples seem to mirror results found using humans, it is still unclear to 








1.24 Animal models: A logical choice? 
Many species of non-human animal have shown the ability to generalise, categorise and 
potentially even form genuine concepts, as described in the human literature (Chittka 
and Jensen, 2011). Non-human species have also demonstrated cognitive bias (Bateson 
et al., 2011, Harding et al., 2004) and innate or learnt preferences (Giurfa et al., 1996, 
Kelber, 1997). Furthermore the ability to utilise multiple memories, i.e. the ability to 
remember how to solve multiple tasks, requiring different answers also occurs in non-
human animal models (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012, Dukas, 1995). As non-human 
animals therefore use learning and memory systems thought to be responsible for the 
production of many of the fallibilities of memory, the use of model systems, such as 
birds, rodents, fish, and bees for exploration into their existence in non-human animals 
seems logical. To this end, this thesis primarily focuses on the bumblebee Bombus 
terrestris as a model to examine how memory changes over time, with an emphasis on 




1.3 Bees as a model for learning and memory 
Bees have long been used as model systems for the study of neuroethology due to their 
behavioural richness, ease of laboratory manipulation and accessible central nervous 
systems (Giurfa, 2003, Menzel, 1968, 1969, Menzel and Giurfa, 2001, Von Frisch, 
1967). There is much literature regarding the learning and basic memory capabilities of 
both honeybees and bumblebees. Honeybees, Apis mellifera can learn to associate 
olfactory stimuli with a reward within only one or two trials, with the learning of 
colours taking up to five trials and black and white patterns requiring five or more trials 
(Menzel, 2009). When trained to a single coloured target they continue to correctly 
choose this stimulus for several days after their initial training (Menzel, 1968). 
Additionally, the bumblebees Bombus ternarius, Bombus terricola (Heinrich et al., 
1977), Bombus bimaculatus (Dukas and Real, 1991), Bombus impatiens (Chittka, 1998) 
and Bombus terrestris (Lihoreau et al., 2010) can retain colour, sensorimotor and 
optimal route information overnight.  
 
The bumblebee Bombus terrestris is known to have a preference for bilateral symmetry 
and it is known that this preference is innate (Rodriguez et al., 2004). Naive individuals, 
who therefore had no prior visual experience with respect to symmetry, preferentially 
chose bilaterally symmetric black and white patterned artificial flowers when given the 
choice between those and asymmetric ones (Rodriguez et al., 2004). It has been inferred 
that this means that the sensory processing pathways in naive bees’ nervous systems are 
therefore primed to respond to common sensory cues found within their natural 
environments: symmetrical flowers. The innate preference for symmetry could be 
considered akin to the preferences and pre-conceptions shown by humans, which are 
known to cause ‘bias’ errors in declarative memory (Bartlett, 1932). Additionally, 
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Giurfa et al. (1996) demonstrated that honeybees can detect and generalise symmetry 
and asymmetry. Bees trained to discriminate bilaterally symmetric from asymmetric 
patterns both learn the task, and also transfer the learnt cues to novel artificial flowers 
(Giurfa et al., 1996, Giurfa and Menzel, 1997). The memory error of ‘bias’ shown by 
humans is thought to be caused by our ability generalise, to economise memory 
(Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 2001), consequently if bees are capable of this generalisation 
they may be suitable for use as non-human models for the study of such a memory 
error. 
 
Honeybees have shown the ability to utilise non-elemental learning in which a 
knowledge as to the relationship between objects, rather than the specific physical 
features of the objects is needed to solve a task. They can successfully learn DMTS and 
delayed non-matching-to-sample (DNMTS) tasks using both solid colours and 
horizontal or vertical striped patterns, thus learning ‘same’ and ‘different’, with an 
ability to transfer these concepts between the sensory modalities olfaction and vision 
(Giurfa et al., 2001). The bumblebee Bombus terrestris has also shown some ability to 
learn a colour-based DMTS task, but only if spatial cues are also available to locate the 
rewarded colour (Dale et al., 2005). Modified DMTS paradigms have already been 
shown to elicit memory errors in the pigeon (Harper and Garry, 2000), rat (Garry and 
Harper, 2009) and gorilla (Schwartz et al., 2004), analogous to those created by the 
‘misinformation effect’ in humans (Loftus, 2005). It may therefore be appropriate to use 
bees as animal models in the study of this known human memory error. Moreover, 
honeybees can categorise objects based on general features, such as ‘landscapes’, ‘plant 
stems’ and ‘flower types’ (Zhang et al., 2004) and can utilise olfactory (Wright et al., 
2008) and number-based visual generalisations (Gross et al., 2009). ‘Misinformation’ is 
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thought to cause declarative memory errors due to an inability to attribute memories to 
the correct source (Schacter and Dodson, 2001). This in turn is considered an unwanted 
by-product of our ability to group things together, for example by generalising or 
categorising, to allow a large amount of information to be stored and retrieved, using 
only a small number of presented items (Chittka and Niven, 2009, Schacter, 1999). As 
such bees, may be an ideal candidate for the study of the effect of postevent cues 
(‘misinformation’) in an animal model. 
 
Additionally, the bumblebee Bombus occidentalis can simultaneously hold and 
alternately retrieve memories for two different colours in order to solve two separately 
presented colour choice tasks (Dukas, 1995). Furthermore, two concepts can even be 
utilised simultaneously by the honeybee (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012). Bees 
successfully learnt both an abstract concept based on spatial relationships: either 
above/below or left/right, and an abstract concept based on the perception of difference 
and successfully transferred this dual-concept to choose unknown targets that were the 
best match of both concepts: the learnt spatial relationship and different from one 
another (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012). Moreover, interference, in which memories 
compete for representational space, thereby interfering with each other has been shown 
to occur in several species of bumblebee. Retroactive interference, in which newly 
learnt information effects the recall of prior learnt information (Müller and Pilzecker, 
1900), effects sensorimotor memories, more specifically flower handling times in 
Bombus impatiens (Chittka and Thomson, 1997, Gegear and Laverty, 1995) and 
Bombus bimaculatus (Woodward and Laverty, 1992), and colour memory in Bombus 
occidentalis (Dukas, 1995). This ability of bees to utilise memories for multiple items 
and/or concepts and the known effects that interference has on them could make them a 
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suitable candidate to investigate the potential for, in a non-human animal, a known 
human memory error specific to the integration of multiple memories: the ‘memory 
conjunction error’ (Reinitz et al., 1992).  
 
Thus, this thesis uses the bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the honeybee Apis mellifera 





1.4 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2: No influence by the innate preference for bilateral symmetry on memory 
degradation in the bumblebee  
Current knowledge and past experiences are known to strongly bias memory in humans. 
An innate preference known in bees provides an ideal opportunity to explore this 
phenomenon in a non-human animal.  In this chapter I explore the potential effect of the 
innate preference for bilateral symmetry on memory degradation in the bumblebee 
Bombus terrestris. I go on to investigate which specific visual features of artificial 
flowers are retained in long-term memory. 
 
Chapter 3: The merging of long-term memories in the bumblebee 
Here, I investigate whether memories for multiple visual items erroneously merge in the 
bumblebee Bombus terrestris. Is a non-human animal susceptible to a misattribution 
error: the memory-conjunction error, known to occur in humans? 
 
Chapter 4: Postevent cues: Are bees susceptible to the ‘misinformation effect’?  
This chapter explores the potential for the misinformation effect to occur in non-human 
animals. I use both the honeybee Apis mellifera and bumblebee Bombus terrestris to 





Chapter 5: False memory susceptibility is correlated with categorisation ability in 
humans 
It has been proposed that semantic false memories may be an inevitable by-product of 
an adaptive feature of human memory: our ability to generalise and form categories and 
concepts. In chapter five I investigate this possibility using human subjects. 
 
Chapter 6: General discussion 
In the final chapter I bring together my findings to readdress whether non-human 
animals are prone to the types of memory errors shown in humans and whether they are 
suitable as models for these types of study. I also discuss my findings in relation to the 













Chapter 2: No influence by the innate preference for bilateral 
symmetry on memory degradation in the bumblebee 
2.1 Introduction 
The reconstructive nature of memory is well-studied in humans, with a plethora of data 
highlighting the inaccuracies that can occur both during memorising itself or in the acts 
of recall and recognition (Loftus, 2005, Schacter, 1999). Bartlett’s (1932) seminal text 
Remembering was one of the first to demonstrate that memory is not nearly as accurate 
as we often assume. For one task he instructed participants to read a North American 
folk-tale and subsequently reproduce the story at various intervals. Bartlett found that 
the participants rarely recalled all the events in the story with accuracy, but instead 
‘remembered’ details that fitted in with their expectations of the story, akin to their 
general knowledge and current beliefs about the world. For example the word ‘canoe’ 
was replaced by the word ‘boat’ and the activity of ‘hunting seals’ was remembered as 
‘fishing’ (Bartlett, 1932). He concluded that memories are therefore highly influenced 
by the expectations and overall attitude of the person remembering, as well as by the 
potentially accurately stored memories of the information to be recalled (Schacter, 
1996). Additionally, Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995) have shown, 
using simple wordlists, how both memory recall and recognition can be easily distorted 
by our knowledge of associations between items. Thus, memory is also easily 
influenced by our pre-existing ideas about how items in the world relate to one another, 





In comparison to the large body of work that exists about memory distortions in human 
subjects, animal studies have largely neglected the possibility that memory might not 
just fade with time, but also be subject to similar distortions as those found in humans. 
This is peculiar, given that there is a vast literature about learning and memory in 
animals from sea slugs (Pinsker et al., 1970), through insects (Gerber et al., 2004, 
Menzel, 2008) and mammals (Pavlov and Anrep, 1927, Skinner, 1938), often with 
important implications for the functioning of human memory. 
 
In this chapter I explore whether a non-human animal, the bumblebee Bombus 
terrestris, is also potentially susceptible to memory inaccuracies, like those shown by 
humans. More specifically, I investigate the potential for memory to be biased by a 
known preference, in this case for the symmetry of visual patterns, in a similar way as 
known stereotypes and pre-conceptions about the world influence human memory 
during recall and/or recognition.   
 
Several species of insect are known to show a preference for symmetrical flowers 
(Giurfa et al., 1996, Møller and Sorci, 1998). In bumblebees it is known that this 
preference is innate. Rodriguez et al. (2004) used naive individuals in their experiments, 
thus controlling for the test subjects’ prior visual experiences, to exclude the possibility 
that the preference is a simpler by-product of visual object recognition following 
specific experiences. Their results indicate that the sensory processing pathways in the 
nervous system of naive bees are primed to respond to relevant sensory cues within 
their environment, as the majority of flowers are symmetrical (Rodriguez et al., 2004). 
This innate preference for symmetry may also have a functional significance as 
symmetrical flowers are thought to be generally more rewarding (Møller and Eriksson, 
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1995) and there is also some evidence that the asymmetries in plants can be viewed as 
an index of developmental instability caused by genetic and environmental factors 
(Møller and Shykoff, 1999, Møller, 2000). Furthermore, Giurfa et al. (1996) 
demonstrated bees’ capacity to detect and generalise symmetry and asymmetry, 
showing that when trained to discriminate bilaterally symmetric from asymmetric 
patterns they can not only easily learn the task, but they can appropriately transfer the 
cues to novel stimuli (Giurfa and Menzel, 1997). 
 
It is not yet known to what extent innate preferences may affect the rate and structure of 
memory degradation for learnt stimuli. Here I investigate whether the innate preference 
for symmetry has an effect on memory degradation in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris. 
I hypothesise that, as time passes after learning, an innate preference, in this case for 
bilateral symmetry with a vertical axis of symmetry, biases memory causing a gradual 
switch in choices to only those stimuli matching the innate preference. For this purpose 
I trained bees to differentially oriented artificial flowers and subsequently tested their 
memories for the learnt flowers at differing time intervals, including a bilaterally 
symmetrical flower as a critical lure, to potentially bias memory. Additionally, I tested a 
sub-set of bees with artificial flowers comprising differing elements of the learnt flower, 
i.e. colours or spatial configuration, to elucidate more specifically what information is 
held in long-term memory. My findings indicate that the innate preference for symmetry 
does not bias memory in the bumblebee. Furthermore my results show that the general 
colours of the learnt flower are held in long-term memory, whilst the specific spatial 




2.2 Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Bees were from eight commercially obtained colonies of Bombus terrestris (Syngenta 
Bioline Bees, Weert, The Netherlands) which were housed in bipartite wooden nest 
boxes (28cmx16cmx11cm). Bees were individually marked on the thorax with 
coloured, numbered markers (Opalith tags, Christian Graze KG, Germany) to allow 
identification. A differing number of bees were used from each colony and each colony 
was utilised for a different length of time (colony/N/time: KS4/N=9/49 days, 
KS5/N=9/25 days, KS6/N=2/2 days, KS7/N=4/8 days, KS8/N=7/19 days, KS9/9/18 
days, KS10/N=16/23 days, KS11/N=10/11 days). Prior to experimentation bees were 
kept naive with no exposure to coloured or oriented artificial flowers given in 
association with food. Colonies were provided ad libitum with defrosted pollen 
(Koppert BV, Berkel en Rodenrijs, The Netherlands) directly into the nest and any extra 
feeding required in addition to the products of the experimental foraging was with 50% 
sucrose solution (v/v) provided directly into colonies’ honey pots. 
 
Set-up 
Experiments were undertaken in a wooden flight arena (l00cmx71cmx71cm), with a 
transparent UV-transmitting Plexiglas™ lid, into which access was provided by means 
of a transparent Plexiglas™ tube. Shutters along the length of the tube enabled the 
traffic of bees into and out of the arena to be controlled. During experimentation, 
artificial flowers were presented vertically on the far wall of the flight arena (Fig. 2.1), 
so that their appearance was independent of the bees’ approach direction. This also 
provided ecological relevance as bilaterally symmetrical flowers are mostly presented 
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All artificial flowers were circular (Ø=7cm) with transparent Perspex™ landing 
platforms (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm) attached beneath the centre. Each platform had a central 
well (Ø=0.6cm, depth=0.2cm), into which the experimenter could place droplets of 
sucrose or water (Fig. 2.2). Additionally each circular flower display disk contained a 
central hole (Ø=0.5cm) positioned directly above the landing platform, which enabled 
the experimenter to replenish rewards by means of a pipette from outside of the arena. 
 
2.21 Experiment A: Does an innate preference for symmetry bias memory?  
Pre-training 
Twenty yellow artificial flowers (Table 2.1) were randomly assigned to positions on the 
presentation wall (Fig. 2.1b) and each was rewarded with a 20µl droplet of 50% sucrose 
solution (v/v). Bees were allowed to forage freely on the flowers and all rewards were 
replenished once they had been consumed, and bees had departed from that flower. This 
allowed bees to become used to the flight arena foraging scenario, familiarise 
themselves with foraging on the artificial flowers and enable the determination of 
individuals that would successfully forage for a minimum of three consecutive foraging 





Figure 2.1 Artificial flower presentation wall showing a) all potential flower 
presentation positions possible, represented by black dots and example flower 
randomisations showing b) pre-training flowers, c) absolute conditioning (for training 
group 0
0
) and d) differential conditioning/testing (again, for training group 0
0
).    
 
Figure 2.2 Example artificial flower (Ø=7cm), showing central hole (Ø=5cm) to enable 
the experimenter to insert a reward droplet from outside the arena by means of an 
electronic pipette. Beneath the hole in front of the artificial flower target, a Perspex™ 
landing platform (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm) is attached. 
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Table 2.1 Artificial flower colour information: Spectrophotometer measurements (hue, 
brightness, saturation and UV reflectivity) for all artificial flower colours used. 
Colour Hue Brightness Saturation UV Reflectivity 
Yellow Green 0.668 0.261 0.146 
Blue Blue-Green 1.064 0.116 0.282 
Red Uncoloured 0.296 0.054 0.133 






Eight yellow coloured artificial flowers, with a blue coloured 45
0
 sector oriented around 
a fixed centre (Table 2.1) (Fig. 2.3a) (Chittka et al., 1988) were randomly assigned to 
positions on the presentation wall (Fig. 2.1c), and each was rewarded with a 20µl 
droplet of 50% sucrose solution (v/v). The orientation of all eight flowers were either 0
0
 
(of the sector’s midline, with respect to vertical) (bilaterally symmetrical around the 
vertical axis of symmetry), or +36
0
 (asymmetrical with respect to a vertical axis) (Fig. 





group), which signified which flower orientation was used for training. Three foraging 
bouts were given and each individual bee’s satiation volume was determined from this 
training phase, to enable the experimenter to administer suitable reward volumes during 
differential conditioning. Bees were allowed to return to the nest box and empty their 
crops between foraging bouts, during which time the randomly allocated positions of 
the flowers were changed to prevent positional learning. Additionally all landing 
platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol to remove any scent marks left by the bees. 
All bees were trained individually. 
 
Differential Conditioning 
Twenty-four yellow coloured artificial flowers, with a blue coloured 45
0
 sector oriented 
around a fixed centre were again randomly assigned to positions on the presentation 
wall (Fig. 2.1d). The twenty-four artificial flowers comprised eight of each of three 
different orientations. For those bees being trained to 0
0
, eight of the flowers were 0
0
 
which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (volumes adjusted for each 
bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning), eight of the 
flowers were -36
0
 and eight of the flowers were +36
0
, all of which were unrewarded 
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(empty) (Fig. 2.3a). For those bees being trained to +36
0
, eight of the flowers were +36
0
 
which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (again, volumes adjusted for 
each bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning), eight of the 
flowers were 0
0
 and eight of the flowers were +72
0
, all of which were unrewarded 
(empty) (Fig. 2.3a). Thus each of the three orientations had a ±36
0
 difference between 
each other. Each bee was allowed to forage until one hundred and fifty choices had been 
made. The definition for a ‘choice’ was the landing of the bee upon the landing platform 
of a flower. Again, bees were trained individually and allowed to return to the nest box 
and empty their crops between foraging bouts. While bees were in the nest, the 
randomly allocated positions of the flowers were changed to prevent positional learning 
and all landing platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol to remove any scent marks left 
by the bees. 
 
Testing 
Only bees that successfully completed training were subsequently tested. Individuals 
were classified as successful if the number of correct choices within their last thirty 
differential conditioning training choices was statistically greater than chance (χ2: 
p<0.05). Each bee was randomly assigned to one of four testing time intervals: 
immediately, twenty-four hours post training, three days post training or five days post 
training, such that each bee was only tested at one of the four possible time intervals and 




) were tested at each of 
the four time intervals (per time interval N=14, per training group and time interval 
combined N=7). The same twenty-four yellow coloured artificial flowers, with a blue 
coloured 45
0
 sector oriented around a fixed centre used in the absolute conditioning 
training were again randomly assigned to positions on the presentation wall. All flowers 
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were unrewarded, but were provided with a 20µl droplet of water to visually encourage 





Figure 2.3 Artificial flowers: a) training and testing flower orientations used in each 
training group: 0
0











. b) testing flower types used in 
experiment B: colour+configuration (identical colour combination and spatial 
configuration as the learnt flower), colour (identical colour combination, but different 
spatial configuration as the learnt flower) and configuration (different colour 




2.22 Experiment B: What aspects of a learned artificial flower are retained in long-
term memory?  
Additionally, to further understand what specific aspects of a learnt flower are retained 
in long-term memory, bees were tested using artificial flowers comprising of the 
different elements contained within the learnt flower: colour and configuration. 
 
Pre-training was undertaken in an identical fashion to that described above. The 
procedures for both absolute and differential conditioning described above were then 
repeated, with the modification that bees were only trained on artificial flowers in which 
the blue sector was presented at 0
0
 upward (bilaterally symmetrical with respect to 
vertical) (Fig 2.3). 
 
Testing 
The procedure for testing described above was repeated, but with the following 
modifications: all bees were tested three days after training. Twenty-four artificial 
flowers were presented: eight 0
0
 flowers (thus, identical colour combination and spatial 
configuration as the learnt flower), eight 50% yellow and 50% blue flowers, with the 
colour division line running horizontally through the centre of the flowers with respect 
to vertical (Fig. 2.3b) (thus, identical colour combination, but different spatial 
configuration as the learnt flower) and eight orange coloured flowers with a red 
coloured 45
0
 sector oriented at 0
0
 of the sector’s midline with respect to vertical (Table 
2.1) (Fig. 2.3b) (thus, different colour combination, but identical spatial configuration as 





The numbers of choices for the correct artificial flower orientation during the last thirty 
differential conditioning training choices were calculated for each individual to analyse 
learning. A 2-sample t-test was used to check for any potential difference in learning 
between the two training groups: 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical with respect to vertical) 
and +36
0
 (asymmetrical with respect to vertical). Additionally the numbers of choices 
for each test flower orientation were calculated for each individual, in each training 
group, at each testing time interval, to analyse memory retention and the potential 
influence of the innate preference for symmetry on memory degradation. A generalised 
linear model with Poisson errors was used to test whether the pooled number of correct 
choices (N=7) (the dependent variable) could be explained by time and/or training (the 
independent variables). Model selection and validation using AIC and/or theta values 
was undertaken and a pseudo-R
2
 value was calculated to check the explanatory power 
of the model. A further generalised linear model with Poisson errors was used to test 
whether the pooled number of choices for symmetry (N=7) (the dependent variable) 
could be explained by time and/or training (the independent variables). Again, model 
selection, validation and an evaluation of the model’s power were undertaken. Finally, 
the numbers of choices for the three flower types comprising different elements 
contained within the learnt flower were calculated and analysed using a Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, to determine what aspects of the learned flower were retained in long-term 
memory. All data were also converted to give average percentages to display 





2.31. Experiment A: Does an innate preference for symmetry bias memory?  
Learning 
There was no significant difference between learning of the two different artificial 
flower orientations: 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical with respect to vertical) and +36
0
 
(asymmetrical with respect to vertical). Discrimination performance is given as the 
number of correct choices in the last thirty differential conditioning training choices 
made (2-sample t-test: t=-0.604, df=54, p=0.548, Fig. 2.4a). It was important to 
establish this, since a significant difference in learning between the two training groups 
may have influenced subsequent memory retention of the bees for the correct flower 
orientation between the training groups. 
 
Memory Retention 
Memory for the learnt flower orientation remained high both initially and twenty-four 
hours after training, falling to around chance level at three days post training (retention 
is given as the number of correct choices out of ten test choices made at one of four time 
intervals) (Fig. 2.4b). This pattern of memory degradation was shown by both training 
groups (0
0
: bilaterally symmetrical with respect to vertical and +36
0
: asymmetrical with 
respect to vertical). The relationship between the number of correct choices and time 
was significant (GLM, Poisson errors: final model: correct choices~time+training, df=7, 
AIC=53.819), both at testing time points ‘initial’ (z=3.583, p<0.001) and ’1 day’ 
(z=3.315, p<0.001). Three days after training this relationship was not significant within 
the model (time ‘3 days’: z=-0.470, p=0.638). No significant relationship between the 
number of correct choices and training was shown (training ‘symmetrical’: z=-0.742, 
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P=0.458). Additionally there was no significant interaction between time and training 
(initial model: correct choices~time*training, AIC=59.62, Chi backwards stepwise 
deletion: time:training: AIC=53.819, p=0.977), therefore this was removed from the 
model. The final model was not over-dispersed (theta<1) and the proportion of variance 
in the number of correct choices explained by it were high (pseudo-R
2
 = 0.991). 
Overall, there was a general trend of a decrease in the number of correct choices over 
time, for both training groups, showing that memory decay occurs. Additionally, 
memory retention was not dependent upon the orientation, and specifically the 





Figure 2.4 a) discrimination performance, given as the percentage of correct choices in 
the last thirty differential conditioning choices. Black horizontal lines indicate medians 
(N=28 per training group), boxes delimit the inter-quartile ranges, and whiskers show 
the ranges. No difference between training groups (2-sample t-test: t=-0.604, df=54, 
p=0.548). b) memory retention, given as the mean percentage of correct choices made 
over time ± SE. Solid line indicates chance level. N=56, 7 per time interval/training 
group. Retention was initially high, then memory degraded over time. (GLM: correct 
choices~time+training: time ‘initial’: z=3.583 p<0.001, time ‘1 day’: z=3.315 p<0.001).  
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Effect of symmetry 
Choices for the bilaterally symmetrical flower (0
0
) were high both initially and twenty-
four hours after training, but only in the group trained to the 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical) 
flower (Fig 2.5). The relationship between the number of choices for the bilaterally 
symmetrical flower and time was significant (GLM, Poisson errors: model: 
symmetry~time*training, df=7, AIC=55.742), both at testing time points ‘initial’ (z=-
2.962, p<0.001) and ’1 day’(z=-3.125, p<0.001), with a significant interaction between 
training at time at those time points (time ‘initial’ and training ‘symmetrical’: z=3.900, 
p<0.001, time ‘1 day’ and training ‘symmetrical’: z=3.776, p<0.001). Three days after 
training, the number of choices for the bilaterally symmetrical flower (0
0
) were at 
approximately chance levels for both training groups: 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical) and 
+36
0
 (asymmetrical) (Fig 2.5) and this was not significant within the model (time ‘3 
days’: z=-0.846, p=0.397). No significant relationship between the number of choices 
for symmetry and training was shown (training ‘symmetrical’: z=-0.272 p=0.786). 
Additionally no significant interaction between time and training was shown from three 
days post learning (time ‘3 days’ and training ‘symmetrical’: z=0.800, p=0.424). The 
model was not over-dispersed (theta<1) and the proportion of variance in the number of 




For the group trained to the 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical) flower, the average choice 
percentage for the bilaterally symmetrical flower (0
0
) both initially and twenty-four 
hours after training was much higher than chance at 70% and 63% respectively (Fig. 
2.6a). Three days after training, performance fell to near chance level (40%) (Fig 2.6a). 
For the group trained to the +36
0
 (asymmetrical) flower, the average choice percentage 
for the flower bilaterally symmetrical with respect to vertical (0
0
), both initially and 
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twenty-four hours after training was lower than chance at 13% and 11% respectively 
(Fig. 2.6b). Three days after training this rose to approximately chance level (31%) and 
then rose again slightly to just above chance level (37%) five days after training (Fig. 
2.6b). Thus, any innate preference for symmetry did not in this case bias memory 
towards the flower bilaterally symmetrical with respect to vertical, with memory 
degrading such that all flower orientations were chosen at approximately chance levels 





Figure 2.5 Effect of symmetry, given as the mean percentage of choices for the 
bilaterally symmetrical flower (0
0
) made over time ± SE. Solid line indicates chance 
level. N=56, 7 per time interval/training group. Choice for symmetry was initially high, 
but only in bees trained to it, and then memory degraded over time, with no influence 
by the innate preference for symmetry seen. (GLM: symmetry~time*training: time 
‘initial’ and training ‘symmetrical’: z=3.900, p<0.001, time ‘1 day’ and training 






Figure 2.6 Orientation curves showing the mean percentage choices for each 
differentially oriented flower during the ten choice test at the four different testing time 
intervals. a) bees trained to 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical flower) and b) bees trained to 
+36
0
 (asymmetrical flower). Solid line indicates chance level. N=56: 7 per time 
interval/per training group. No influence by the innate preference for symmetry on 




2.32 Experiment B: What aspects of a learned artificial flower are retained in long-
term memory? 
No bees made any choices for the ‘configuration’ flowers during the test, thus this 
flower type was excluded from the analysis. The ‘configuration’ flower type was a 
different colour combination to the learnt flower type, but identical to it in terms of the 
spatial configuration of the colours within it (Fig. 2.3b).  
 
There was no significant difference between the number of choices made for the learnt 
flower type: 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical, with respect to vertical) (‘correct’) and the 
‘colour’ flower type, which was identical in colour combination, but different in the 
spatial configuration of the colours presented to the learnt flower type  (Wilcoxon rank 
sum test: w=59.5, p=0.401). 52% of the test ten test choices were for the learnt flower 
type: 0
0
 (bilaterally symmetrical, with respect to vertical) (‘correct’) and 48% of the ten 
test choices were for the ‘colour’ flower type (Fig. 2.7). Thus, bees retain information 
pertaining to the colours present in a learnt flower type in long-term memory, but 






Figure 2.7 Choice accuracy, given as the mean percentage of choices made for each of 
the three flower types during the ten choice test ± SE, three days post training. Solid line 
indicates chance level, N=10. Both the learnt flower type (‘correct’) and the flower type 
with the learnt colour combination (‘colour’) were favoured, but with no difference 












My findings show that in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris, the innate preference for 
bilateral symmetry has no influence on the structure of memory decay. Bees trained on 
artificial flowers either bilaterally symmetrical or asymmetrical (with respect to vertical) 
show high levels of memory retention both initially and twenty-four hours after 
learning. General memory degradation, with all flowers being chosen at around chance 
level has occurred by the time three days have elapsed after learning. 
 
Bumblebee memory does not therefore seem to be as susceptible to the potential 
influences/biases of known preferences in the same way as known associations, 
stereotypes or attitudes and expectations about the world can bias human memory 
(Bartlett, 1932, Loftus, 2005, Roediger and McDermott, 1995). Here I have shown that 
when presented with an artificial flower displaying features know to be innately 
preferred by bees (in this case bilateral symmetry, with respect to vertical), this innate 
bias does not interfere with the memory process, such that this is not picked with 
increased frequency, but that all testing flower types are picked with equal frequency, 
showing that memory simply degrades over time. 
 
Furthermore my results show that different features of a learnt flower appear to be 
retained in memory for differing lengths of time. Bumblebees retained colour 
information (in this case yellow and blue) for longer than configurational information 
about the pattern features within the flower (in this case the specific orientation of the 
learnt flower and more generally the presence of a differentially coloured 45
0
 sector 
within an otherwise solidly coloured flower). The bumblebees Bombus ternarius, 
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Bombus terricola (Heinrich et al., 1977), Bombus bimaculatus (Dukas and Real, 1991), 
Bombus impatiens and Bombus occidentalis (Chittka, 1998) have long been known to 
retain colour information at least overnight, and colour retention is also know to last 
several days in the honeybee Apis mellifera (Menzel, 1968). However there is also 
evidence that some pollinating insect species may retain configurational information in 
their long-term memory. The honeybee has been shown to successfully visually 
recognise and discriminate images of human faces, two days after training has ceased 
(Dyer et al., 2005). It is known that configural processing is utilised when solving the 
task (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2010). These studies did not however use both colour and 
configurational differences, and as such it is still largely unknown whether bees use a 
‘hierarchy’ system when remembering different cues.   
 
Additionally my findings do not show whether it is potentially a combination of colours 
that bees are able to hold in long-term memory, or whether it is simply the predominant 
colour of a learnt flower that is remembered. A follow-up study in which artificial 
flowers which present the colours from the learnt flowers separately during the test 
would be needed to clarify this point. 
 
In nature, bees are often known to exhibit flower constancy, in which only one flower 
species (and as such colour and/or morphology) is visited for a period of time (Waser, 
1986). It has been hypothesised that this constancy occurs due to temporal limitations 
on retrieving information from long-term memory compared to short-term memory, and 
the potential for more errors to occur when retrieving information about multiple items, 
as opposed to one (Chittka et al., 1999). Thus, flower constancy should increase as bees 
encounter flowers that are increasingly dissimilar in morphology or colour (Waser, 
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1986). Additionally bees are known to generalise to colours after learning, with the 
original test colour having a significant effect on the number of choices for new test 
colours, such that those most similar in colour to the learnt colour are chosen with the 
greatest frequency (Gumbert, 2000). Thus my finding that Bombus terrestris 
preferentially chooses test flowers that are the same colour combination as the originally 
learnt flower, over test flowers that are distinctly different colours, but in the same 
configuration as the originally learnt flower are not that surprising.    
 
Overall, my result that memory in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris is not influenced by 
its innate preference for bilateral symmetry indicates that it may not be as susceptible to 
the inaccuracies of memory caused by known preferences in the way that human 
memory is. However the methodology used in this study is quite different from that 
administered in the classic human experiments and as such my results are not directly 
comparable. Conversely, there is some evidence that methodologies adapted from 
human false memory studies, for use with non-human animals, produce results that may 
be surprisingly comparable. Garry and Harper (2009) demonstrated that humans when 
tested using a methodology back-translated from a paradigm created to test the effect of 
postevent cues (akin to misinformation) in the pigeon Columbia livia and rat Rattus 
norvegicus, showed analogous results to those obtained using the classic verbal 
misinformation paradigms. Additionally, my findings do not exclude the possibility that 
the bumblebee may be susceptible to other types of memory inaccuracies seen in human 
memory. Other non-human animals have already been shown to be susceptible to 
postevent cues, which are akin to the misinformation effect that occurs in humans 




Chapter 3: The merging of long-term memories in the 
bumblebee 
3.1 Introduction 
The way in which animals (including humans) process sensory input and the ability to 
store it in memory and subsequently recall it to enable modification of behaviour 
appropriate to the current situation, has long been of interest. The degree to which 
memories for multiple inputs within the same sensory domain affect the recall of one 
another has been widely studied in humans, with much now known about interference 
theory (Dewar et al., 2007, Jonides and Nee, 2006), and the use of misinformation 
(Loftus, 1997, Loftus, 2005). Interference, in which memories compete for 
representational space, thereby interfering with each other, is known to occur in three 
forms: proactive, in which prior learnt information inhibits the recall of more recently 
learnt information (Keppel and Underwood, 1962), retroactive, in which newly learnt 
information impedes the recall of prior learnt information (Müller and Pilzecker, 1900) 
and output, in which the act of recalling information itself interferes with further 
retrieval of that information (Tulving and Arbuckle, 1966). 
 
Such interference effects are known from across the animal kingdom, including in 
pollinating insects. For example, retroactive interference has been shown in the 
bumblebees Bombus bimaculatus (Woodward and Laverty, 1992), Bombus impatiens 
(Chittka and Thomson, 1997, Gegear and Laverty, 1995) and Bombus occidentalis 
(Chittka, 1998, Dukas, 1995). Additionally, proactive interference effects have been 
shown in the rat Rattus norvegicus (Dunnett and Martel, 1990) and both proactive and 
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retroactive interference effects shown in the pigeon Columba livia (Grant, 1975, Grant 
and Roberts, 1976). 
 
However, some forms of interference between multiple memories have been studied 
almost exclusively in humans. One example is the misinformation effect, in which 
information given between memory encoding and recall and/or recognition distorts 
memory for the original information. Whilst this is similar to retroactive interference, 
the new information actually biases the previously stored memory, rather than resulting 
in its suppression (Loftus, 1975, McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985) . Additionally humans 
are known to make predictable memory errors specific to the integration of multiple 
memories. The ‘memory conjunction error’, in which small pieces of information from 
multiple memories are combined to create a hybrid ‘memory’ comprising those pieces, 
has been shown to occur during the recognition of both nonsense words and pictures of 
faces and during the recall of simple sentences (Reinitz et al., 1992, Reinitz and Demb, 
1994). For example participants who memorised a list of words including barter and 
valley subsequently mistakenly recognised the word barley (Rubin et al., 1999). 
 
In animals the misinformation effect has been reported in only a handful of species. A 
gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla; Schwartz et al., 2004) exhibited event memory biasing 
from misleading photographs, whilst postevent cues (akin to misinformation) have been 
shown to bias colour recognition in the pigeon (Harper and Garry, 2000) and lever 





Thus, compared to the vast knowledge about how multiple inputs affect the recall of one 
another in human memory, much less is known for non-human animals. In this chapter I 
explore whether a non-human animal, the bumblebee Bombus terrestris, is also 
potentially susceptible to memory ‘merging’ as occurs in human subjects. Specifically I 
ask whether in bumblebees, the memories for multiple leant items are combined, 
causing the erroneous choice of a hybrid item during recall and or/recognition, akin to 
the memory conjunction error that occurs in human memory (Reinitz et al., 1992, 
Reinitz and Demb, 1994, Rubin et al., 1999). I hypothesise that, as time passes after 
learning, the memory traces for visually distinct flower types may ‘merge’, such that 
visual features learnt in distinct training bouts are combined in the mind, so that a 
flower type that has never been viewed before, but is a combination of the features 
presented during training is mistakenly chosen. For this purpose I trained bees using a 
reversal learning paradigm to both a solid coloured artificial flower and a black and 
white patterned artificial flower and subsequently tested their memories for the learnt 
flowers at differing time intervals, including a hybrid flower comprised of a 
combination of both the main features of the learnt flowers: colour and concentric circle 
patterning, as a critical lure to potentially bias memory. Additionally, I tested a sub-set 
of bees that had been trained to a black and white patterned artificial flower, whose 
pattern was different to the pattern presented in the hybrid flower, to confirm that any 
‘merging’ is not simply a generalisation to either of the individual training features: 
colour or pattern. My findings indicate that the bumblebee, when required to utilise its 
long-term memory, commits an error in which information from multiple memory 
traces ‘merge’. Furthermore my results show that this is a genuine ‘merging’ of 




3.2 Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Bees were from four commercially obtained colonies of Bombus terrestris (Syngenta 
Bioline Bees, Weert, The Netherlands), and were housed in bipartite wooden nest boxes 
(28cmx16cmx11cm). Bees were individually marked on the thorax with coloured, 
numbered markers (Opalith tags, Christian Graze KG, Germany) to allow identification. 
A differing number of bees were used from each colony and each colony was utilised 
for a different length of time (colony/N/time: KM0/N=8/12 days, KM1/N=14/24 days, 
KM2/N=13/19 days, KM3/N=10/6 days). Prior to experimentation bees were kept naive 
with no exposure to coloured or patterned artificial flowers given in association with 
food. Colonies were provided ad libitum with defrosted pollen (Koppert BV, Berkel en 
Rodenrijs, The Netherlands) directly into the nest and any extra feeding required in 
addition to the products of the experimental foraging was with 30% sucrose solution 
(v/v) provided directly into colonies’ honey pots. 
 
Set-up 
Experiments were undertaken in a wooden flight arena (l00cmx71cmx71cm), with a 
transparent UV-transmitting Plexiglas™ lid, into which access was provided by means 
of a transparent Plexiglas™ tube. Shutters along the length of the tube enabled the 
traffic of bees into and out of the arena to be controlled. During experimentation 
artificial flowers were presented vertically on the far wall of the flight arena (Fig. 3.1), 





All artificial flowers were circular (Ø=7cm) with transparent Perspex™ landing 
platforms (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm) connected to and placed directly in from of them. Each 
platform had a central well (Ø=0.6cm, depth=0.2cm), into which the experimenter could 
place droplets of sucrose or water (Fig. 3.2). Additionally each artificial flower 
contained a central hole (Ø=0.5cm) positioned directly above the landing platform, 
which enabled the experimenter to replenish rewards by means of a pipette from outside 
of the arena. 
 
3.21 Experiment A: Do memories for two visually distinct artificial flowers merge?  
Pre-training 
Eight white coloured, black rimmed artificial flowers (Table 3.1) were randomly 
assigned to positions on the presentation wall and each was rewarded with a 20µl 
droplet of 50% sucrose solution (v/v) (Fig. 3.1a). Bees were allowed to forage freely on 
the flowers and all rewards were replenished once they had been consumed, and bees 
had departed from that flower. This allowed bees to become used to the flight arena 
foraging scenario, familiarise themselves with foraging on the artificial flowers and 
enable the determination of individuals that would successfully forage for a minimum 
of three consecutive foraging bouts who were therefore suitable for further testing. A 
reversal learning paradigm was then administered to create conflict between two 





Figure 3.1 Artificial flower presentation wall showing all potential flower presentation 
positions possible, represented by black dots and example flower randomisations 
showing a) pre-training flowers, b) absolute conditioning (for training group ‘colour’), 
c) differential conditioning and d) testing. 
 
Figure 3.2 Example artificial flower (Ø=7cm), showing central hole (Ø=5cm) to enable 
the experimenter to insert a reward droplet from outside the arena by means of an 
electronic pipette. Beneath the hole in front of the artificial flower target, a Perspex™ 
landing platform (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm) is attached. 
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Table 3.1 Artificial flower colour information: Spectrophotometer measurements (hue, 
brightness, saturation and UV reflectivity) for all artificial flower colours used. 
Colour Hue Brightness Saturation UV Reflectivity 
White Blue-Green 1.679 0.232 0.417 
Black Uncoloured 0.156 0.013 0.048 






Either eight yellow coloured artificial flowers (C) (Table 3.1) (Fig. 3.3), or eight black 
and white artificial flowers patterned with concentric circles (BW-r) (Table 3.1) (Fig. 
3.3) were randomly assigned to positions on the presentation wall and each was 
rewarded with a 20µl droplet of 50% sucrose solution (v/v) (Fig. 3.1b). Bees were 
randomly assigned to one of two training groups: ‘colour’ or ‘black and white’ (N=15 
per group), which signified which flower type the bee would be trained to first: C for 
‘colour’ and BW-r for ‘black and white’. Three foraging bouts were completed by 
subjects and each individual bee’s satiation volume was determined from this training 
phase, to enable suitable reward volumes to be administered during differential 
conditioning. Bees were allowed to return to the nest box and empty their crops between 
foraging bouts, during which time the randomly allocated positions of the flowers were 
changed to prevent positional learning. Additionally all landing platforms were cleaned 




Sixteen artificial flowers were again randomly assigned to positions on the presentation 
wall (Fig. 3.1c). For those bees being trained to ‘colour’ (C), eight of the flowers were 
yellow coloured which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (volumes 
adjusted for each bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning) 
and eight of the flowers were black and white patterned with concentric circles (BW-r), 
which were unrewarded (empty). For those bees being trained to ‘black and white’ 
(BW-r), eight of the flowers were black and white patterned with concentric circles 
which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (again, volumes adjusted for 
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each bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning) and eight of 
the flowers were yellow coloured, which were unrewarded (empty). Each bee was 
allowed to forage until one hundred choices had been made. The definition for a 
‘choice’ was the landing of the bee upon the landing platform of an artificial flower. 
Again, bees were trained individually and allowed to return to the nest box and empty 
their crops between foraging bouts. Whilst bees were in the nest, the randomly allocated 
positions of the flowers were changed to prevent positional learning and all landing 
platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol to remove any scent marks left by the bees. 
 
For those bees showing a number of correct choices within their last twenty differential 
conditioning training choices statistically greater than chance (χ2: p<0.05), both absolute 
and differential conditioning were then repeated, but with the rewarded and unrewarded 
flower types reversed, such that those bees initially trained to and rewarded upon the 
yellow coloured flowers (C) were then trained to and rewarded upon the black and 





Figure 3.3 Artificial flowers: training and testing flowers. The hybrid flower (H) 
comprises a combination of the features from the flowers ‘colour’ (C) and ‘black and 
white relevant’ (BW-r), such that both the colour (yellow) and the pattern (concentric 
circles) are presented in it. The pattern in the ‘black and white irrelevant’ flower (BW-i) 





Only bees that successfully completed training were subsequently tested. Individuals 
were classified as successful if the number of correct choices within the last twenty 
choices of their second differential conditioning training was statistically greater than 
chance (χ2: p<0.05). Each bee was randomly assigned to one of three testing time 
intervals: immediately, twenty-four hours post training or three days post training, such 
that each bee was only tested at one of the three possible time intervals and that an even 
number of bees from each training group (‘colour’ and ‘black and white’) were tested at 
each of the three time intervals (per time interval N=10, per training group and time 
interval combined N=5). These testing time intervals allowed both short-term and long-
term memory to be studied. The same eight yellow coloured artificial flowers (C) and 
eight black and white artificial flowers patterned with concentric circles (BW-r) used in 
the differential conditioning training were again randomly assigned to positions on the 
presentation wall (Fig. 3.1d), as well as eight of a hybrid flower (H) (Fig. 3.3). The 
hybrid flowers (H) comprised a combination of the features from the two different 
flower types presented during differential training: colour (C) and black and white 
patterned with concentric circles (BW-r), such that both the colour (yellow) and the 
pattern (concentric circles) were presented in it. All flowers were unrewarded, but were 
provided with a 20µl droplet of water to visually encourage foraging. One foraging bout 




3.22 Experiment B: Does generalisation or merging occur? 
To confirm that memory merging really occurs rather than a generalisation to either of 
the flower features (colour or concentric circle patterning) the experimental procedure 
was modified to include a training group using a black and white flower showing a 
pattern irrelevant to that displayed in the hybrid flower. Pre-training was undertaken in 
an identical fashion to that described above. Again, a reversal learning paradigm was 




The procedure for absolute conditioning described above was repeated, but with the 
following modifications of the artificial flower patterns. Either eight black and white 
artificial flowers patterned with concentric circles (BW-r), (Fig. 3.3) or eight black and 
white artificial flowers patterned with horizontal and vertical lines in a grid structure 
(BW-i) (Fig. 3.3) were presented. Bees were randomly assigned to one of two training 
groups: ‘relevant black and white pattern’ or ‘irrelevant black and white pattern’ (N=10 
per group), which signified which flower type the bee would be trained to first: BW-r 
for ‘relevant black and white’ and BW-i for ‘irrelevant black and white’ and also 
whether the pattern used in the training flower type was relevant to the pattern used in 







The procedure for differential conditioning described above was repeated, but with the 
following flower modifications. Sixteen artificial flowers were again randomly assigned 
to positions on the presentation wall. For those bees being trained to ‘relevant black and 
white pattern’ (BW-r), eight of the flowers were black and white patterned with 
concentric circles which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (volumes 
adjusted for each bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning) 
and eight of the flowers were yellow coloured (C), which were unrewarded (empty). For 
those bees being trained to ‘irrelevant black and white pattern’ (BW-i), eight of the 
flowers were black and white with horizontal and vertical lines in a grid structure (BW-
i) which were rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose (v/v) (again, volumes adjusted 
for each bee, using the satiation volumes determined by absolute conditioning) and 
eight of the flowers were yellow coloured (C), which were unrewarded (empty). 
 
Again, for those bees showing a number of correct choices within their last twenty 
differential conditioning training choices statistically greater than chance (χ2: p<0.05), 
both absolute and differential conditioning were then repeated, but with the rewarded 
and unrewarded flower types reversed, such that those bees initially trained to and 
rewarded upon both types of black and white patterned flowers (BW-r and BW-i) were 








The procedure for testing described above was repeated, but with the following 
modifications. All bees were tested twenty-four hours post training as Experiment A 
showed this to be a testing time interval of interest. Twenty-four artificial flowers were 
presented. For those bees that had been trained to the ‘relevant black and white pattern’ 
(BW-r), the same eight yellow coloured flowers (C) and eight black and white flowers 
patterned with concentric circles (BW-r) used in the differential conditioning training 
were presented, as well as eight of the hybrid flower (H). In this scenario the hybrid 
flower type was indeed comprised of a combination of the two features of the training 
flower types: yellow colour and concentric circles. For those bees that had been trained 
to the ‘irrelevant black and white pattern’ (BW-i), the same eight yellow coloured 
flowers (C) and eight black and white flowers patterned with horizontal and vertical 
lines in a grid structure (BW-r) used in the differential conditioning training were 
presented, as well as eight of the hybrid flower (H). In this scenario the hybrid flower 
type was not comprised of a combination of the two features of the training flower 











The numbers of choices for all different flower types displayed during testing were 
calculated for each individual, in training group, at each testing time interval, to analyse 
memory retention and the potential occurrence of memory merging. A generalised 
linear model with Poisson errors was used to test whether the pooled number of choices 
for the last rewarded flower type (N=5) (the dependent variable) could be explained by 
time and/or training (the independent variables). Model selection and validation using 
AIC and/or theta values was undertaken and a pseudo-R
2
 value was calculated to check 
the explanatory power of the model. A further generalised linear model with Poisson 
errors was used to test whether the pooled number of choices for the hybrid flower type 
(N=5) (the dependent variable) could be explained by time and/or training (the 
independent variables). Again, model selection, validation and an evaluation of the 
model’s power were undertaken. Additionally the data were separated into the numbers 
of choices for all flower types made during the first half of the test (first ten choices) 
and the second half of the test (second ten choices), as the test length was over double 
the number of possible ‘correct’ choices that could be made. These data were used to 
analyse genuine memory ‘merging’ over generalisation. Two 2-sample t-tests were used 
to test whether the numbers of choices for both the last rewarded flower type and the 
hybrid flower type were significantly different between the group trained to the relevant 
black and white pattern and the group trained to the irrelevant black and white pattern. 
A further 2-sample t-test was used to test whether the difference in the number of 
choices for the hybrid flower type, between the first ten and second ten choices of the 
twenty choice test, was significantly different between these too training groups. All 
data were also converted to give average percentages to display graphically. All 




3.31 Experiment A: Do memories for two visually distinct artificial flowers merge? 
Memory Retention 
Memory for the last rewarded flower type was initially high for both training groups (C 
then BW-r and BW-r then C). Twenty-four hours after training it then fell considerably, 
again in both training groups, followed by a slight rise again at three days post training 
(retention is given as the number of choices for the last rewarded flower type out of 
twenty test choices made at one of three time intervals) (Fig. 3.4). The relationship 
between the number of choices for the last rewarded flower type and time was 
significant (GLM, Poisson errors: final model: choice for last rewarded~time+training, 
df=5, AIC=42.586), both at testing time points ‘1 day’ (z=-4.045, p<0.001) and ’3 days’ 
(z=-4.045, p<0.001). No significant relationship between the number of choices for the 
last rewarded flower type and training was shown (training ‘C then BW-r’ z=0.410, 
p=0.682). Additionally there was no significant interaction between time and training 
(initial model: choice for last rewarded~time*training, AIC=46.097, Chi backwards 
stepwise deletion: time:training: AIC=42.586, p=0.783), therefore this was removed 
from the model. The final model was not over-dispersed (theta<1) and the proportion of 
variance in the number of choices for the last rewarded flower type explained by it were 
high (pseudo-R
2
=0.980). Overall, there was a general trend of a decrease in the number 
of choices for the last rewarded flower type over time, for both training groups, showing 
that memory decay occurs. However the amount of memory decay was different 
between the training groups, with a greater decay shown by those bees trained to the 
relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first and greater memory retention shown 




For the group trained to the colour flower type (C) first, the average choice percentage 
was highest for the last rewarded flower type: relevant black and white (BW-r) at all 
three time intervals – 68% initially, 42% twenty-four hours after training and 49% three 
days after training (Fig. 3.4). Thus at all three time intervals, memory retention was 
high and the effects of retroactive interference were seen (secondary information, in this 
case the black and white relevant flower type (BW-r) impeded the recall of prior learnt 
information, in this case colour (C)). For the group trained to the relevant black and 
white flower type (BW-r) first, the average choice percentage was highest for the last 
rewarded flower type: colour (C), only initially (69%) (Fig. 3.4). Twenty-four hours and 
three days after training it had fallen to just above chance at 35% and 38% (Fig. 3.4). 















Figure 3.4 Memory retention, given as the mean percentage of choices for the last 
rewarded flower types made over time ± SE. Solid line indicates chance level. N=30, 5 
per time interval/training group. Retention was initially high, and then memory 
degraded over time. Although decay was greatest in those bees trained to the relevant 
black and white flower type (BW-r) first, whilst retention was greatest in those bees 
trained to the colour flower type (C) first (GLM: correct choices for last 











Choices for the hybrid flower type were initially low for both training groups (C then 
BW-r and BW-r then C). Twenty-four hours after training they rose, again in both 
training groups, but more considerably in those bees trained to the relevant black and 
white flower type (BW-r) first. Three days post training the rise remained, only in those 
bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first, with choices for 
the hybrid flower type falling again in those bees trained to the colour flower type (C) 
first (merging is given as the number of choices for the hybrid flower type out of twenty 
test choices made at one of three time intervals) (Fig. 3.5). The relationship between the 
number of choices for hybrid flower type and time was significant (GLM, Poisson 
errors: final model: choice for hybrid~time+training, df=5, AIC=39.713), both at testing 
time points ‘1 day’ (z=3.382, p<0.001) and ’3 days’ (z=2.697, p=0.007). Additionally, a 
significant relationship between the number of choices for the hybrid flower type and 
training was shown (training ‘C then BW-r’ z=-2.505, p=0.012). Furthermore, there was 
no significant interaction between time and training (initial model: choice for 
hybrid~time*training, AIC=43.563, Chi backwards stepwise deletion: time:training: 
AIC=39.713, p=0.928), therefore this was removed from the model. The final model 
was not over-dispersed (theta<1) and the proportion of variance in the number of 
choices for the last rewarded flower type explained by it were high (pseudo-R
2
=0.992). 
Overall, there was a general trend of an increase in the number of choices for the hybrid 
flower type over time, for both training groups (Fig 3.5). However memory ‘merging’ 
only occurred in those bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) 






Figure 3.5 Memory ‘merging’, given as the mean percentage of choices for the hybrid 
flower type made over time ± SE. Solid line indicates chance level. N=30, 5 per time 
interval/training group. Merging occurred at 1 day and 3 days post training, but only in 
those bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first (GLM: 











For the group trained to the colour flower type (C) first, twenty four hours after training 
the mean percentage choice for the last rewarded flower type: relevant black and white 
(BW-r) was just above chance (36 , where chance expectation would have been 
33.33 %) for the first half of the test (first ten choices) (Fig. 3.6a), but rose to 64% 
during the second half of the test (second ten choices) (Fig. 3.6a). The mean percentage 
choice for the hybrid flower type (H) was at approximately chance level (34%) during 
the first half of the test (first ten choices) (Fig. 3.6a), and fell to below chance 18% for 
the second half of the test (second ten choices) (Fig. 3.6a). Three days after training, the 
mean choice percentage for the last rewarded flower type: relevant black and white 
(BW-r) was above chance level throughout the test (mean = 42% & 56%) (Fig. 3.7a). 
Conversely, the mean percentage choice for the hybrid flower type (H) was below 
chance level throughout the test (mean = 23% & 30%) (Fig. 3.7a). 
 
For the group trained to the relevant black and white pattern flower type (BW-r) first, 
twenty four hours after training the mean percentage choice for the last rewarded flower 
type: colour (C) was above chance (48%) for the first half of the test (first ten choices) 
(Fig 3.6b) but below chance (22%) during the second half of the test (second ten 
choices) (Fig. 3.6b). Conversely, the mean percentage choice for the hybrid flower type 
(H) was at approximately chance level (32%) during the first half of the test (first ten 
choices) (Fig. 3.6b), but above chance (52%) for the second half of the test (second ten 
choices) (Fig. 3.6b). Three days after training the same trend was seen: last rewarded 
flower type: colour (C): mean = 52% & 24% (Fig. 3.7b), hybrid flower type (H): mean 
= 34% & 52% (Fig. 3.7b). Thus the above result of the occurrence of memory 
‘merging’ stemmed from the switch in choices from the last reward flower type to the 





Figure 3.6 Mean choice percentages ± SE twenty-four hours after training, split for the 
first ten and second ten choices of the twenty choice test for a) bees trained to the colour 
flower type (C) first and b) bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type 
(BW-r) first. N=5, solid line indicates chance level. Bees switched choices from for the 
last rewarded flower type: colour (C) to the hybrid flower type (H), but only bees 






Figure 3.7 Mean choice percentages ± SE three days after training, split for the first ten 
and second ten choices of the twenty choice test for a) bees trained to the colour flower 
type (C) first and b) bees trained to relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first. 
N=5, solid line indicates chance level. Bees switched choices from for the last rewarded 
flower type: colour (C) to the hybrid flower type (H), but only bees trained to the 




3.32 Experiment B: Does generalisation or merging occur? 
There was a significant difference in the number of choices made for the last rewarded 
flower type: colour (C), between the two training groups: relevant black and white 
pattern (BW-r) and irrelevant black and white pattern (BW-i) (Welch 2-sample t-test: 
t=-3.881, df=10.378, p=0.003). Additionally, there was a significant difference in the 
number of choices made for the hybrid flower type (H) between the two training 
groups: relevant black and white pattern (BW-r) and irrelevant black and white pattern 
(BW-i) (2-sample t-test: t=2.416, df=18, p=0.027). 
 
For the group trained to the irrelevant black and white flower type (BW-i), the average 
choice percentage was highest for the last rewarded flower type: colour (C) (57%), with 
choices for the hybrid flower type (H) being low (27.5%) (Fig 3.8a). For the group 
trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r), the average choice 
percentage was similar for both the hybrid flower type (H) (38.5%) and the last 
rewarded flower type: colour (C) (37.5%) (Fig 3.8b). Thus, memory ‘merging’ only 
occurred in those bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) when 
long-term memory was utilised. This result therefore supports a genuine ‘merging’ of 







Figure 3.8 Mean choice percentages ± SE twenty-four hours after training for a) bees 
trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first and b) bees trained to 
the irrelevant black and white flower type (BW-i) first. N=10, solid line indicates 
chance level. Memory merging, not generalisation occurred as bees favoured the 
‘hybrid’ (H) flower type but only bees trained to the relevant black and white flower 




There was a significant difference in the number of choices made for the hybrid flower 
type  (H) between the first ten and second ten choices of the twenty choice test, between 
the two training groups: relevant black and white (BW-r) and irrelevant black and white 
(BW-i) (2-sample t-test: t=-2.689, df=18, p=0.015, Fig 3.9). The median choice 
percentage difference (first ten choices– second ten choices) for the hybrid flower type 
(H), for the relevant black and white (BW-r) training group was -20% (Fig. 3.9). This 
was due to an increase in choices for the hybrid flower type (H), at the expense of the 
number of choices for the last rewarded flower type: colour (C) over the course of the 
test (Fig 3.10a). Conversely, the median percentage choice difference (first ten choices– 
second ten choices) for the hybrid flower type (H), for the irrelevant black and white 
(BW-i) training group was 0 (Fig. 3.9), thus no increase in choices for the hybrid flower 
type (H) occurred over the course of the test (Fig. 3.10b). As such, the results again 
support the earlier findings of the occurrence of memory ‘merging’ when long-term 
memory is utilised, rather than a generalisation and that the merging stemmed from a 
switch in choices from the last rewarded flower type to the hybrid flower type over the 














Figure 3.9 Difference in choice percentages for the hybrid flower (H) (first ten test 
choices – second ten test choices), split by the relevance of the training pattern (BW-r or 
BW-i) to the hybrid flower (H). Thick black horizontal lines indicate medians (N=10 
per training group), boxes delimit the inter-quartile ranges, and whiskers show the 
ranges. A significant difference between training groups was found (2-sample t-test: t=-
2.689, df=18, p=0.015). Bees trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) 
increased their choices for the hybrid flower type (H) over the test, whilst bees trained 
to irrelevant black and white flower type (BW-i) showed few choices for the hybrid 










Figure 3.10 Pooled cumulative choices (N=10) for both the last rewarded flower type 
(C) and the hybrid flower type (H) over the course of the twenty choice test. a) bees 
trained to the relevant black and white flower type (BW-r) first and b) bees trained to 
the irrelevant black and white flower type (BW-i) first. Only bees trained to the relevant 
black and white flower type (BW-r) increased their choices for the hybrid flower type 




My findings show that in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris memory ‘merging’ occurs, 
whereby multiple memory traces combine, causing inaccuracy of memory. Bees trained 
on two visually distinct artificial flower types, solid colour and black and white 
patterned, show high levels of memory retention initially, but twenty-four hours after 
learning erroneously choose a hybrid flower that comprises a combination of the two 
learnt visual features: colour and pattern. 
 
Bumblebee memory therefore seems to be susceptible to an error specific to the 
integration of multiple memories in a similar way as human memory does in certain 
experimental settings. The ‘memory conjunction error’ in which partial information 
from multiple memories are combined to create a ‘hybrid memory’ containing elements 
of multiple memories is known to effect human memory for pictures of faces, nonsense 
words and simple sentences (Reinitz et al., 1992, Reinitz and Demb, 1994).  Here I have 
shown that, when presented with an artificial flower displaying a combination of 
features previously learnt, bees mistakenly select this, rather than either memory 
retention remaining high with the learnt flower types being selected above chance, or 
memory simply degrading over time with all flower types picked equally.  
 
Additionally, my results show that this ‘merging’ is the result of a genuine confusion of 
the information from the memory traces of both training flower types and not just due to 
a generalisation to the training colour. When a different, non-relevant black and white 
pattern was used in training, but the original hybrid flower type was displayed in the 




However, this ‘merging’ also appears dependent upon the order in which the different 
artificial flower types are learnt. When a black and white patterned flower is last 
rewarded, this is remembered at the expense of the first rewarded flower type: solid 
colour, and is retained in memory for three days after learning. This is an expected 
outcome when retroactive interference is in effect (Müller and Pilzecker, 1900). In 
retroactive interference, newly learnt information impedes the recall of prior learnt 
information and it is thought that this occurs due to competition between the two 
memories, rather than the overwriting of the original memory by the new one (Briggs, 
1954). As a result retroactive interference increases when both the stimuli to be learnt 
and both the responses required to solve the tasks show similarity (Anderson and 
Myrow, 1971). Recently it has been shown that in the honeybee Apis mellifera 
retroactive interference does indeed occur in landmark learning tasks due to response 
competition. Cheng and Wignall (2006) found that if the two learnt tasks had 
conflicting response requirements, in which task one required the bee to turn right at a 
green landmark and task two required the bee to turn left at a blue landmark, then the 
effect of retroactive interference when re-attempting task one were pronounced. In 
opposition they found that when response competition was minimised during either 
training and/or testing the effect of retroactive interference were either greatly 
diminished, or even completely eradicated (Cheng and Wignall, 2006).     
 
Conversely, when a solid coloured flower is last rewarded, twenty-four hours after 
learning, memory ‘merging’ occurs. This is a curious finding and highlights the 
potential importance of the order of artificial flower presentation in a reversal learning 
paradigm for both experimental design and data interpretation. Additionally, it may 
have implications about the strengths of memory traces for differing artificial flower 
types: colours vs. patterns. In the honeybees, it is known that colour learning takes 
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fewer trials (1-5) than does the learning of black and white patterns (5+ trials) (Menzel, 
2009). It may be that the memory traces for the black and white patterned flower type 
were stronger than for the colour flower type, and as such were more resistant to both 
degradation and manipulation. In humans it is known that stronger memory traces are 
less prone to the effects of suggestibility (Pezdek and Roe, 1995). However memory 
strength is known to increase with the frequency of the presentation of the item to be 
remembered (Ebbinghaus, 1964). In this study all bees made the same number of 
learning choices for both the black and white patterned flower type and the colour 
flower type, thus although the absolute number of ‘looks’ at both the flower types 
during learning, nor the absolute time taken to learn the two flower types were recorded, 
all bees would have encountered each of the two flower types with approximately the 
same frequency.  
 
Furthermore, memory ‘merging’ appears to occur as a result of a switching of choices 
from the last rewarded flower, to the hybrid flower type, over the course of the test. 
Thus, once bees discover that the last rewarded flower type is no longer rewarded, 
‘merging’ occurs. It is therefore possible that such ‘merging’ may occur as cognitive 
demand increases, when bees are forced to recall an earlier memory almost concurrently 
to the more recently formed memory, due to a change in a previously learnt ‘rule’. 
Specifically in this study the test was twenty choices in length, but only eight flowers of 
the last rewarded flower type were presented. Thus, after eight previously ‘correct’ 
choices, a bee will have discovered that the once ‘correct’ flower type is no longer so, 





One potential explanation for the formation of the memory conjunction error is that the 
failure occurs at retrieval (Rubin et al., 1999) and involves ‘processing fluency’ (Jacoby, 
1991). In this argument, during recall or recognition source monitoring, which is the set 
of processes that make attributions about memory origins (Johnson, 1988, Johnson et 
al., 1993) is low and as a result a misattribution occurs due to ‘remembering’ on the 
basis of the feeling of familiarity (Rubin et al., 1999). These ‘memories’ are therefore 
based not on the recollections of the specific details of items to be recalled/recognised, 
but on a more general feature that not only applies to the items to be recalled but also to 
other items, which results in their erroneous retrieval. It is known that human memory 
utilises the cognitive processes of categorisation and generalisation, in which a large 
number or items can be stored and recalled based on just a few exemplars, in order to 
economise and gain efficiency (Chittka and Niven, 2009, McClelland, 1995). Schacter 
(1999, 2001) proposed that memory errors caused by misattribution (one of which is the 
memory conjunction error) may therefore simply be inevitable by-products of this 
adaptive cognitive ability to form general concepts. Many non-human animal species 
can also generalise, categorise and potentially even form concepts (Chittka and Jensen, 
2011), with much research showing that the honeybee is one such species (Avarguès-
Weber et al., 2011, Giurfa et al., 1996, Wright et al., 2008, Zhang et al., 2004). It is 
perhaps therefore not so surprising that my findings show the occurrence of a 
misattribution error in a pollinating insect.  
     
Overall, my result that the bumblebee Bombus terrestris, when required to utilise its 
long-term memory for multiple visual targets that had previously been rewarding, 
commits an error in which information from multiple memory traces ‘merge’ is akin to 
the memory conjunction error seen in humans (Reinitz et al., 1992, Reinitz and Demb, 
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1994, Rubin et al., 1999), and is the first example of memory ’merging’ in a non-human 





























Chapter 4: Postevent cues: Are bees susceptible to the 
‘misinformation effect’? 
4.1 Introduction 
The ‘misinformation effect’ is a commonly used methodology and term for the 
production of false memories in humans. Misleading information given between 
memory encoding and recall biases memory in the direction of the misinformation 
(Loftus, 2005). In the first example of this, Loftus et al. (1978) showed participants a 
slide show depicting a minor road accident. Upon subsequent completion of a 
questionnaire containing misleading information about details such as the colours of the 
cars involved and the type of road signs present at the scene, participants answers were 
frequently biased in the direction of the misleading information. Thus, incorrect 
misinformation caused memory errors leading to a lower score than if no 
misinformation was given, whilst information given that was consistent with the 
original information led to a higher score. It is known that misinformation biases 
memory, rather than fully interfering with it, as the original memory remains intact 
(McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985). More recently, studies have shown that the use of 
misinformation can also lead to the creation of ‘rich’ false memories that are often 
episodic and/or autobiographical in nature (Bernstein et al., 2005). 
 
In this chapter I explore whether non-human animals, in this case the bumblebee 
Bombus terrestris and the honeybee Apis mellifera are also potentially susceptible to 
memory inaccuracies, like those shown by humans. More specifically, I investigate the 
potential for memory to be biased by postevent cues, in this case colour, in a similar 
manner to the way in which misinformation biases human memory. 
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There is little information in the literature regarding the effects of misinformation in 
non-human animals, when compared to the plethora of work undertaken on this subject 
in human subjects. This is because most of the human studies rely on verbal 
communication, which obviously cannot be replicated in non-human animals. However, 
the effect of misinformation has been studied in some non-human animals using non-
verbal post event cues, inserted into the delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) paradigm. 
The DMTS paradigm (Blough, 1959) is a commonly used methodology for 
investigating learning and memory in non-human animals. In the paradigm, the subject 
learns to match a sample with one of two or more comparisons, presented after a delay. 
As such, the sample is no longer present at the decision point. Subjects are thought to 
utilise both working memory and long-term memory to successfully learn the paradigm 
(Blough, 1959). As such, the DMTS paradigm has begun to be utilised in the study of 
the effect of misinformation in non-human animals. The delay, given after the sample to 
be remembered, but before the choice test, allows ‘misinformation’ to be inserted, as is 
frequently done in human studies.  
 
Honeybees are known to successfully learn visual DMTS tasks, using both solid colours 
and horizontal and vertical striped visual patterns (Giurfa et al., 2001). They have also 
been shown to be capable of transferring these learnt concepts of ‘sameness’ and 
‘difference’ between the sensory modalities olfaction and vision (Giurfa et al., 2001). 
Studies with bumblebees however have shown mixed results. Dale et al. (2005) found 
that the bumblebee Bombus terrestris can use cues to prime later colour choice, but only 





‘Misinformation’ has been shown to negatively affect event memory in a gorilla Gorilla 
gorilla gorilla (Schwartz et al., 2004), and the rat Rattus norvegicus has also been 
shown to be susceptible to misleading information (Garry and Harper, 2009). 
Additionally, Harper and Garry (2000) biased recognition in a visual, three-colour 
DMTS task with the pigeon Columba livia using postevent cues. Memory was biased in 
the direction of the misinformation, such that if it was consistent with the sample and 
was thus consistent with the correct choice in the matching test, performance was 
improved, but when it was inconsistent with the sample and was thus consistent with the 
incorrect choice in the matching test, performance decreased. Conversely, honeybees do 
not appear to be affected by postevent cues in a visual DMTS task.  Zhang et al (2005) 
found that bees trained to a DMTS task involving black and white visual patterns are 
not mislead by the insertion of the incorrect pattern during the delay, and continue to 
correctly choose the test choice that matches the sample. However, there are distinct 
methodological differences between the two DMTS studies. Harper and Garry (2000) 
found that the timing of the postevent cue presentation was critical, with memory only 
being biased when it was presented at the very end of the delay period. In the Zhang et 
al (2005) study, the postevent cue was not presented at the end of the delay period. 
Additionally, Harper and Garry (2000) tested three different types of postevent cue: 
‘consistent’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘neutral’, indicating their relationship to the sample and 
correct and incorrect comparisons, to fully explore the potential for memory biases, 
whereas Zhang et al (2005) only presented the incorrect comparison as a postevent cue. 





Clearly, there is limited information about the extent to which misinformation may 
affect non-human animals. Here I investigate whether postevent cues bias memory in 
both the bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the honeybee Apis mellifera. I hypothesise 
that information given subsequent to information to be remembered biases memory, 
more specifically in the direction of that information, leading to memory accuracy either 
above, below or the same as baseline memory accuracy, depending on the direction of 
the secondary information. For this purpose I trained bees to a three-colour DMTS task 
and then inserted postevent cues at the end of the delay to potentially bias memory. My 
findings indicate that neither honeybees, nor bumblebees are biased by postevent cues, 
unlike how humans are biased by misinformation. However I note methodological 




4.2 Materials and Methods 
The general methods were based on Zhang et al. (2005), with protocol details for 
delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) training and postevent cue testing adapted from 
Harper and Garry (2000). 
 
4.21 Experiment A: Do postevent cues bias memory in the honeybee? 
Subjects 
Honeybees Apis mellifera were from one naturally foraging colony housed on the 
rooftop of the second floor of the G.E Fogg Building, Queen Mary University of 
London, UK (colony/N/time: KPEH1/N=3/12 days). Bees were individually marked on 
the thorax with coloured paint to allow identification. 
 
Set-up 
Experiments were undertaken in a wooden y-maze with a transparent UV-transmitting 
Plexiglas™ lid (Fig. 4.1). The y-maze consisted of several interconnected sections: the 
main tunnel (69cmx27cmx25cm), which was divided into the entrance/sample chamber 
(26cmx27cmx25cm) and the delay/postevent cue chamber (43cmx27cmx25cm) by the 
sample, and the decision chamber/arms (29cmx20cmx25cm) into which access was 
gained by flying through a hole located centrally within the postevent cue. During 
experimentation all samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers were 
presented vertically, so that their appearance was to some extent independent of the 




Samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers 
All samples were circular (Ø=14cm) with a black rimmed central hole (Ø=2.5cm), 
which enabled bees to fly through (Fig. 4.2a). Postevent cues were identical in size and 
shape to samples (Fig. 4.2a). All comparison artificial flowers were circular (Ø=7cm) 
with transparent Perspex™ landing platforms (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm) in the centre. Each 
platform had a central well (Ø=0.6cm, depth=0.2cm) into which the experimenter could 
place droplets of sucrose solution, quinine hemisulfate solution or water (Fig. 4.1b). 
 
Pre-training 
Bees were trained to fly through the y-maze and forage upon the comparison artificial 
flowers presented at the far ends of the two arms. To achieve this, bees were transferred 
manually from a feeder located away from the hive (3m), to a balcony positioned at the 
entrance of the y-maze, using a piece of cardboard (3cmx1cmx0.2cm) doused with 50% 
sucrose solution (v/v). The balcony (with feeding bee) was then manually moved 
through the y-maze. The bee was allowed to return to the hive once satiated and 
independently fly back to the point in the y-maze it had departed from, until successful 
independent foraging at the end of the y-maze was achieved. The sample, postevent cue 
and comparison artificial flowers were ‘blanks’, such that they were white in colour 
(Table 4.1) (Fig. 4.3a), which matched the interior colour of the y-maze. This pre-
training allowed bees to become used to the y-maze foraging scenario, familiarise 
themselves with foraging on the comparison artificial flowers and enable the 
experimenter to determine the individuals that would successfully independently forage 
for a minimum of three consecutive foraging bouts, and which were therefore suitable 




Figure 4.1 Y-maze set-up showing the interconnected chambers and the presentation 
positions of the sample, postevent cue and comparison artificial flowers. Each trial 
consisted of a bee flying from the entrance, through the hole located within the sample 
(to be remembered) to the delay chamber, then through the hole located within the 
postevent cue into the decision chamber, and into one of the two arms to forage upon 




Figure 4.2 Geometry of samples, postevent cues and artificial flowers. a) 
sample/postevent cue (Ø=14cm), showing black rimmed central hole (Ø=2.5cm) to 
enable through flight and b) comparison artificial flower with attached Perspex™ 
landing platform (1.5cmx1.5cmx1cm). The landing platform had a central well 
(Ø=0.6cm, depth=0.2cm), in which droplets of 50% sucrose solution (v/v) (reward) or 





Table 4.1 Sample, postevent cue and comparison artificial flower colour information: 
Spectrophotometer measurements (hue, brightness, saturation and UV reflectivity) for 
all colours used. 
Colour Hue Brightness Saturation UV Reflectivity 
White Blue-Green 1.679 0.232 0.417 
Black Uncoloured 0.156 0.013 0.048 
Yellow Green 0.668 0.261 0.146 
Green Green 0.680 0.202 0.184 






Bees were trained to a three colour delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) paradigm. A 
random training regime was used, such that the sample colour, correct side and incorrect 
comparison artificial flower colour were only the same for a maximum of two 
consecutive trials. Forty-two trials were given in total. The three colours used for the 
sample and comparison artificial flowers were yellow, green and purple (Table 4.1) (Fig 
4.3b). The postevent cue was again a ‘blank’ (Fig 4.3a). Each trial consisted of the bee 
flying from the entrance/sample chamber, through a hole in the sample (to be 
remembered) to the delay/postevent cue chamber, then through a hole in the postevent 
cue into the decision chamber, and into one of the two arms to forage upon one of the 
two comparison artificial flowers. The correct comparison artificial flower was 
rewarded with a droplet of 50% sucrose solution (v/v), whilst the incorrect comparison 
artificial flower contained a droplet of saturated quinine hemisulfate solution. Quinine 
hemisulfate solution is distasteful to bees and was used as a punishment as it has been 
shown that bees quickly learn to avoid it and its use leads to stronger discrimination 
than using unrewarded flowers (Chittka et al., 2003). However for the first two trials, 
the incorrect comparison artificial flower was empty to prevent bees from being 
dissuaded from returning. The definition for a ‘choice’ was the landing of the bee upon 
the landing platform of a comparison artificial flower. After a correct choice bees were 
allowed to consume the reward and fly back to the hive. After an incorrect choice bees 
were allowed to discover the correct comparison artificial flower and obtain the reward 
before returning to the hive. Between trials the sample and comparison artificial flowers 
were changed in accordance with the pseudorandom training regime. Additionally all 
landing platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol to remove any scent marks left by the 




Figure 4.3 Samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers. a) ‘blank’ 
postevent cue (white, with a black-rimmed central hole) used in pre-training, training 
and testing: baseline data, and ‘blank’ comparison artificial flower (white, black-
rimmed, with centrally placed landing platform) used in pre-training. b) coloured 
samples (yellow, green and purple, with black-rimmed central holes) used in training 
and testing: postevent cues, coloured postevent cues used in testing: postevent cues, and 
comparison artificial flowers (yellow, green and purple, with centrally placed landing 





Four tests were performed. Each consisted of one 1-minute trial, during which both 
comparison artificial flowers were unrewarded, but filled with water to visually 
encourage foraging. In each test the number of times the bee made a choice for each of 
the two comparison artificial flowers was recorded. Additionally the delay time (the 
time taken for the bee to fly through the delay chamber between the sample and the 
postevent cue) was recorded. The first test was to determine the baseline level for 
DMTS learning. As such this test was the same as a training trial in terms of using a 
coloured sample and comparison artificial flowers, but a ‘blank’ postevent cue (Fig. 
4.3). The colours for the sample and comparison artificial flowers were randomly 
chosen so that they were different for each bee. The other three tests were to determine 
the effect (if any) of postevent cues on memory. Three types of postevent cue were 
used, one for each test. The postevent cue was either ‘consistent’ (the same colour as the 
sample and as such the correct comparison artificial flower), ‘inconsistent’ (the same 
colour as the incorrect comparison artificial flower), or ‘neutral’ (the colour not 
represented by the sample and correct comparison artificial flower, nor the colour 
represented by the incorrect artificial flower). Again the colours were randomly chosen 
so they were different for each bee. Furthermore, the order of the three postevent cue 
tests was randomised between bees. Between each of the four tests a six trial training 
‘refresher’ was given to re-establish the aim of the task. Again between trials/tests all 
landing platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol. All bees were tested individually. 





4.22 Experiment B: Do postevent cues bias memory in the bumblebee? 
Subjects 
Bees were from three commercially obtained colonies of Bombus terrestris (Syngenta 
Bioline Bees, Weert, The Netherlands), and were housed in bipartite wooden nest boxes 
(28x16x11cm). Bees were individually marked on the thorax with coloured, numbered 
markers (Opalith tags, Christian Graze KG, Germany) to allow identification. A 
differing number of bees were used from each colony and each colony was utilised for a 
different length of time (colony/N/time: KPE5/N=8/8 days, KPE6/N=7/12 days, 
KPE8/N=5/15 days). Prior to experimentation bees were kept naive with no exposure to 
colour given in association with food. Colonies were provided ad libitum with defrosted 
pollen (Koppert BV, Berkel en Rodenrijs, The Netherlands) directly into the nest and 
any extra feeding required in addition to the products of the experimental foraging was 
with 30% sucrose solution (v/v) provided directly into colonies’ honey pots. 
 
The set-up was as described in section 4.21 (Fig. 4.1), with the modification that access 
to the entrance of the y-maze was by means of a transparent Plexiglas™ tube. Shutters 
along the length of the tube enabled the traffic of bees into and out of the arena to be 
controlled. Samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers were identical to 
those described in section 4.21 (Fig. 4.2). Pre-training was also as depicted in section 
4.21, with the exception that the balcony was moved through the y-maze when the bee 
was not present on it. Thus it was moved in between foraging bouts, upon bees’ return 






Bees were trained on a three colour delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) paradigm, 
with the colours and ‘blank’ used the same as those described in section 4.21 (Table 
4.1) (Fig. 4.3). Training was of a block design*, in which each colour (sample) was 
learnt individually, for fifteen trials, with the correct side being alternated every three 
trials and the incorrect comparison artificial flower colour being assigned randomly, 
with a maximum of two consecutively. Thus, a total of forty-five training trials were 
given. The correct comparison artificial flower was rewarded with a droplet of 50% 
sucrose solution (v/v), whilst the incorrect comparison artificial flower contained a 
droplet of water**.  The definition for a ‘choice’ was identical to that in section 4.21. A 
correct choice was followed by manual removal of the bee from the y-maze, who was 
then returned to the nest box to empty their crop. After an incorrect choice bees were 
allowed to discover the correct comparison artificial flower and obtain the reward 
before being returned to the nest***. Between trials the sample and comparison 
artificial flowers were again changed in accordance with the training regime and all 
landing platforms were cleaned with 70% ethanol. All bees were trained individually. 
 
*Preliminary work showed that bees would fail to return to complete training if the 
training protocol was completely random.   
**Preliminary work showed that bees would fail to return to complete training if 
punishment was given for an incorrect choice. 
***Preliminary work showed that bees would fail to return to complete training if they 




Bees completing the forty-five training trials were then given an additional ten trials, 
which were random, with a maximum of two consecutively, with respect to the sample 
colour, the correct side and the colour of the incorrect comparison artificial flower. 
Choice determination, reward obtainment, inter-trial handling and cleaning were as 
described above. Those bees scoring 70% or more correct within those ten trials were 




Bees were given ten trials, identical to those just described. From this a baseline score 
for DMTS learning was obtained. 
 
Postevent cues 
Bees were then given thirty trials, during which a coloured postevent cue was added. 
The three postevent cue types used were identical to those depicted in section 4.21. The 
protocol design was such that each of the three postevent cue types was used an equal 
number of times (10) and that they were randomly displayed, with a maximum of two 
of the same type used consecutively. Additionally, each of the three colours was used as 
a postevent cue approximately the same number of times (yellow=11, green=10, 
purple=9), which again were randomly displayed, with a maximum of two 
consecutively. The sample colour and incorrect comparison artificial flower colour were 
also random with a maximum of two consecutively, and the correct side was random 
with a maximum of three consecutively. From this, scores for the effect of postevent 
cues were obtained. Again choice determination, reward obtainment, inter-trial handling 
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and cleaning were as described above. All bees were tested individually. Again, the full 
training and testing protocol required one full day per bee. 
 
Data Analysis 
The effect of postevent cues on memory was examined by calculating the pure 
probability of the bees making the number of correct choices observed, for the baseline 
test and all three postevent cue test types. However, due to a low sample sizes (N=3 and 
N=1) and therefore a lack of statistical power, no direct comparison between treatments 
was undertaken. Additionally, the number of choices for each arm of the y-maze was 
examined for all bees to look for any side biases. These numbers were analysed using a 
chi-squared test to look for any significance. Furthermore, learning was calculated for 
some bees using the percentage of correct choices over the course of training, with 
training divided into bins of five trials. All data were also converted to give percentages 






4.31 Experiment A: Do postevent cues bias memory in the honeybee? 
The pure probability of all bees (N=3) making the number of correct choices observed 
was both low and significant for all treatments (baseline: p=0.001, consistent: p=0.004, 
inconsistent: p=0.003, neutral: p=0.013). Therefore postevent cues had no effect on 
memory accuracy for the three-colour delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task, 
regardless of the postevent cue type used. However, due to a low sample size (N=3) and 
therefore a lack of statistical power, I could not directly compare between treatments. 
Average memory accuracy was 83  for the baseline test, 77  for the ‘consistent’ 
postevent cue treatment, 79  for the ‘inconsistent’ postevent cue treatments and 69  
for the ‘neutral’ postevent cue treatment (Fig 4.4a).  
 
Additionally the average delay time for all four treatments was within the known five 
second working memory time limit of honeybees (Zhang et al., 2005): ‘baseline’= 3 
seconds, ‘consistent’ = 2 seconds, ‘inconsistent’= 3 seconds, ‘neutral’= 2 seconds (Fig. 
4.4b).  
 
Furthermore, no bee showed a significant side bias during the forty-two trial training 
paradigm, selecting neither the left or right arm more often than predicted by chance 
(‘yellow’: χ2=0.857, df=1, p=0.355, ‘white’: χ2=0, df=1, p=1, ‘gold’: χ2=0.381, df=1, 







Fig 4.4 a) Effect of postevent cues given as mean percentage of correct choices ± SE for 
treatments: ‘baseline, ‘consistent’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘neutral’. N=3, solid line indicates 
chance level, b) mean delay time (seconds) ± SE for treatments: ‘baseline, ‘consistent’, 
‘inconsistent’ and ‘neutral’. N=3. No effect of postevent cues, memory accuracy 
remained high for all four treatments (pure probabilities for correct choices achieved: 
baseline: p=0.001, consistent: p=0.004, inconsistent: p=0.003, neutral: p=0.013). All 





Figure 4.5 Choice percentages for each y-maze arm: left or right, compared against the 
potential choice percentages for each side if perfect learning occurred. N=3, solid line 
indicates chance level. No side biases exhibited (‘yellow’: χ2=0.857, df=1, p=0.355, 




4.32 Experiment B: Do postevent cues bias memory in the bumblebee? 
Only one bee (Orange9B) successfully completed the full training and testing regime. 
The pure probability of the bee making the number of correct choices observed was low 
and significant for all treatments (baseline: p=0.011, consistent: p=0.011, inconsistent: 
p=0.001, neutral: p=0.011). Therefore, postevent cues had no effect on memory 
accuracy for the three-colour delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task, regardless of 
the postevent cue type used. However, due to a low sample size (N=1) and therefore a 
lack of statistical power, I could not directly compare between treatments. Memory 
accuracy was 90  for the baseline test, 90  for the ‘consistent’ postevent cue 
treatment, 100  for the ‘inconsistent’ postevent cue treatment and 90  for the ‘neutral’ 
postevent cue treatment (Fig. 4.6a).  
 
Additionally, the bee showed a significant side bias, selecting the right arm more often 
than predicted by chance during the forty-five trial training regime (χ2=8.022, df=1, 
p=0.005) (Fig. 4.6b). However this was predicted from the training regime (in which 
perfect learning would mean 60% choices for the right arm and 40% choice for the left 
arm), with further analysis showing a bias towards making correct choices to the right, 
as expected (χ2=32.207, df=3, p<0.01). Thus, as shown above in the honeybee postevent 






Figure 4.6 a) Effect of postevent cues given as mean percentage of correct choices for 
treatments: ‘baseline, ‘consistent’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘neutral’. N=1, solid line indicates 
chance level. b) choice percentages for each y-maze arm: left or right, compared against 
the potential choice percentages for each side if perfect learning occurred. N=1, solid 
line indicates chance level. No effect of postevent cues is observed; memory accuracy 
remained high for all four treatments (pure probabilities for correct choices achieved: 
baseline: p=0.011, consistent: p=0.011, inconsistent: p=0.001, neutral: p=0.011). Right 
side bias observed, as expected from successful learning (χ2=32.207, df=3, p<0.01). 
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An additional twenty bumblebees failed to successfully complete the training regime 
(achieve 70% or more correct choices in the ten trials administered after the forty-five 
trial training phase), and as such were not carried forward to testing. Ten of the bees 
failed to continue to return from the nest box within the first ten training trials. No 
analysis was performed on these data. Four bees continued to return from the nest box 
after the tenth training trial, but then either failed to continue to return from the nest box 
before the forty-fifth training trial or the training regime was halted as it was clear 
learning was not taking place. Finally, six of the bees completed the forty-five training 
trials, but either failed to achieve 70% or more on the ten additional, or failed to return 
to complete the ten additional trials.  
 
All these ten bees showed a significant side bias, selecting either the left arm or the right 
arm of the y-maze more often than predicted by chance (Orange14: χ2=9.8, df=1, 
p=0.002, OrangeB: χ2=33.8, df=1, p<0.001, Green11 χ2=10.667, df=1, p= 0.001, 
Orange43: χ2=11.267, df=1, p<0.001, Orange89: χ2=5, df=1, p=0.025, Yellow26: 
χ2=5.765, df=1, p=0.016, Orange20: χ2=18.689, df=1, p<0.001, Orange82: χ2=16.2, 
df=1, p<0.001, Yellow66: χ2=30.422, df=1, p<0.001, Orange65: χ2=16.2, df=1, 
p<0.001). For six of the bees, the side bias was to the left, opposite to that predicted 
from the training regime (in which perfect learning would mean more choices for the 
right arm than for the left arm) (Fig. 4.7a), whilst for four of the bees the side bias was 
an exaggeration of that predicted from the training regime (4.7b). Therefore successful 
learning of the three-colour DMTS task by bumblebees was hampered by side biases, 





Figure 4.7 Choice percentages for each y-maze arm: left or right, compared against the 
potential choice percentages for each side if perfect learning occurred. a) bees showing 
side biases opposite to those predicted from training. N=3, solid line indicates chance 
level. b) bees showing side biases exaggerated from those predicted from training. N=3, 





In an attempt to avoid the effects of the spatial bias found in bumblebees trained in a y-
maze (i.e. consistent preferences by individuals for one arm or the other), an additional 
experiment was undertaken using a modified flight arena. Full methodological details 





My findings show that in the honeybee and the bumblebee Bombus terrestris, memory 
may not be biased by postevent cues. Bees that have successfully learnt a three-colour 
delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) task continue to show high memory accuracy for 
the sample even when different postevent cues are inserted at the end of the delay 
period. However, due to methodological issues, the sample sizes obtained were very 
low (N=3 and N=1), and as such caution should be taken when drawing any 
conclusions. Additionally, bumblebees show significant side biases when attempting to 
learn in a maze-based paradigm. These side biases appear to be pre-existing, rather than 
a result of any training regime. 
 
Bee memory does not therefore seem to be as susceptible to the biasing influence of 
postevent cues in the way in which human memory is biased by misinformation (Loftus 
and Palmer, 1974, McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985). My results also differ from the 
findings from studies with other non-human animal species, which show that the gorilla 
(Schwartz et al., 2004), rat (Garry and Harper, 2009) and pigeon (Harper and Garry, 
2000) are all biased by misinformation/postevent cues in a similar way to humans. 
 
However for the honeybee, my results are consistent with findings of Zhang et al. 
(2005), who showed that memory accuracy for bees that had successfully learnt a visual 
DMTS task remained high even when the incorrect comparison was inserted as a 
potential distracter during the delay period. Their explanation for their finding is that the 
distance of the sample presentation within the tunnel was fixed throughout training, and 
as such the bees, rather than learning specifically to remember what was presented, 
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were more simply learning to attend to and remember whatever was at this specific 
distance. This explanation was confirmed with their further finding that when the 
distance was altered during testing, memory accuracy fell to chance level (Zhang et al., 
2005). This explanation is also potentially applicable to both my honeybee and 
bumblebee findings, as the sample was always presented at the same fixed distance 
from the entrance to the y-maze. Thus, if true, in order to truly test for any effect of 
postevent cues, bees would need to first be trained to a DMTS task in which the sample 
distance was varied in order to prevent this learning of a distance and promote a more 
general learning of the overall concept/rule: to remember the sample seen before the 
delay period.  
 
My finding of a strong side bias in attempting to train bumblebees to spatially separated 
artificial flowers is striking. It appears that this may be pre-existing, rather than learnt, 
as it was often opposite to that expected from the training regime and virtually 
impossible to overwrite through training. At present there is a lack of information about 
this specific potential side bias in the published literature, however there is some recent 
evidence to suggest that bumblebees exhibit a behaviour akin to ‘handedness’ (also 
termed lateralisation). ‘Handedness’ is a behaviour shown by humans in which a side 
bias for motor output, perception and/or information processing occurs (Goulson et al., 
2013). Kells and Goulson (2001) found that three species of bumblebee (Bombus 
lapidarius, Bombus lucorum and Bombus pascuorum) showed a tendency for rotation in 
the same direction around inflorescences on successive trials. Interestingly however, 
they did not find such ‘handedness’ in Bombus terrestris (Kells and Goulson, 2001). 
Additionally, Anfora et al. (2011) found that this lateralisation occurs in olfactory 
learning in the bumblebee Bombus terrestris. Bees trained using the classic proboscis 
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extension reflex (PER) paradigm, in which the left and right antennae were used 
independently, showed a right-sided bias in the short-term memory recall of an odour 
(Anfora et al., 2011). This right-sided bias has also previously been shown to occur in 
the both olfactory and visual learning in the honeybee Apis mellifera (Letzkus et al., 
2006, Letzkus et al., 2008). Furthermore, upon consultation with colleagues I have 
learnt that this side-bias is a potentially well-known, yet under-published problem. This 
highlights the importance of information sharing, to try to avoid known problems with 
experimental design. 
 
My finding that bumblebees in this paradigm were reluctant to return from trial to trial 
to complete training is also interesting. Perhaps if a task is deemed too hard to learn, or 
no reward reinforcement is obtained within a certain timeframe, a bee will choose to 
simply give up. This therefore also has implications for protocol design.     
  4. 
Overall, my results show that memory in the honeybee and the bumblebee Bombus 
terrestris may not be biased by postevent cues, like human, gorilla, rat and pigeon 
memory, are influenced by ‘misinformation’. This conclusion is however drawn with 
caution due to the low sample sizes obtained. My finding of significant side biases in 
the bumblebee highlights the importance of experimental design, and a possible 
problem that may arise from potentially innate spatial biases when administering maze 






4.5 Appendix 1: Experiment C: Do postevent cues bias memory in the 
bumblebee (using a modified arena)? 
To try to circumvent the effects of the spatial bias found in bumblebees trained in a y-
maze (i.e. consistent preferences by individuals for one arm or the other), an additional 
experiment was undertaken using a modified flight arena, such that instead of the 
comparison artificial flowers being presented in spatially separate ‘arms’, they were 
presented twice on a single wall: once as a pair on the left hand side, and once as a pair 
on the right hand side (Fig. 4.8).  
 
4.51 Materials and methods 
The flight arena design and general method for the delayed matching-to-sample 
(DMTS) training was adapted from Schumacher (2010) and Spaethe, J. (personal 
communication 4
th
 January 2012). Subjects were obtained, labelled, housed and fed as 
described in section 4.22 (colony/N/time: KPE9/N=5/7 days, KPE10/N=5/25 days).  
 
Set-up 
Experiments were undertaken in a wooden flight arena with a transparent UV-
transmitting Plexiglas™ lid (Fig. 4.8). The arena consisted of several interconnected 
sections: the main tunnel (50x27x25cm), which was divided into the entrance/sample 
chamber (25cmx27cmx25cm) and the delay/postevent cue chamber (25x27x25cm) by 
the sample, and the decision chamber (40x60x30cm) into which access was gained by 
flying through a hole located centrally within the postevent cue. Access to the entrance 
of the main tunnel was by means of a transparent Plexiglas™ tube. Shutters along the 
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length of the tube enabled the traffic of bees into and out of the arena to be controlled. 
During experimentation all samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers 
were presented vertically, so that their appearance was independent of the bees’ 
approach direction. 
 
All samples, postevent cues and comparison artificial flowers were as depicted in 
section 4.22 (Table 4.1, Fig 4.2, 4.3). Additionally, the procedures for pre-training, 
training and testing were as described in section 4.22, with the exception of the 
following modification: a saturated quinine hemisulfate solution, not water, was offered 
on the landing platforms of the incorrect comparison artificial flowers.  
 
Moreover, to prevent bees from forming a positional bias that may result from the use 
of the block training regimen, a separate set of bees were trained using a pseudorandom 
training regime, such that the sample colour, correct side (within each pair presented) 
and incorrect comparison artificial flower colour (for both pairs) was only the same for 
a maximum of two consecutive trials. Furthermore, this training lasted for sixty trials, 
with the last ten trials counting as the baseline DMTS performance if 70% or more 








Fig 4.8 Modified flight arena set-up showing the interconnected chambers and 
presentation positions of the sample, postevent cue and comparison artificial flower 
pairs. Each trial consisted of a bee flying from the entrance, through the hole located 
within the sample (to be remembered) to the delay chamber, then through the hole 
located within the postevent cue into the decision chamber, to forage upon one of the 











All five bees failed to successfully complete the training regime (achieve 70% or more 
correct choices in the ten trials administered after the forty-five trial training phase), and 
therefore were not carried forward to testing. Three of the bees failed to continue to 
return from the nest box within the first ten training trials. No analysis was undertaken 
on these data. One of the bees (Orange37) completed the forty-five training trials, but 
failed to achieve 70% or more on the ten additional trials, scoring only 50% correct 
choices. Finally, one bee (Orange30) continued to return from the nest box after the 
tenth training trial, but the training regime was halted as it was clear learning was not 
taking place. This bee only chose artificial comparison flowers within the left hand side 
pair, showing a significant bias for the left comparison artificial flower within that pair 
(χ2=17.286, df=1, p<0.001) (Fig. 4.9a). 
 
Pseudorandom training 
All five bees failed to successfully complete the training regime (achieve 70% or more 
correct choices in the last ten trials of the sixty training trials), and as such were not 
carried forward to testing. Three of the bees failed to continue to return from the nest 
box within the first twenty training trials. No analysis was undertaken on this data. One 
of the bees (Brown37) completed the sixty training trials, but failed to achieve 70% or 
more during the last ten trials, scoring only 60% correct choices. Finally, one bee 
(White87) continued to return from the nest box after the twentieth training trial, but 
failed to return from the next box after forty-five trials. This bee initially showed a 
preference for the comparison artificial flower in location ‘left left’ (the left flower 
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within the pair on the left of the presentation wall), but switched to choosing the 
comparison artificial flower in the location ‘right right’ (the right flower within the pair 
on the right of the presentation wall) over the course of training (Fig. 4.9b). Thus, it 







Figure 4.9 Choice percentages for each side (left or right), within each pair (left or 
right) of comparison artificial flowers. a) a bee (Orange 30) reaching twenty-eight trials 
of the block protocol. N=1, solid line indicates chance level within a pair. A significant 
side bias for the left flower within the left hand pair was observed (χ2=17.286, df=1, 
p<0.001). b) a bee (White87) trained to the pseudorandom protocol. Training data 
divided into bins of five trials. A changing side bias from flower ‘left left’ to flower 




Chapter 5: False memory susceptibility is correlated with 
categorisation ability in humans 
5.1 Introduction 
When remembering the past, we typically feel that our memory allows retrieval of 
events as they really occurred. Yet a large body of work shows that memory is often 
surprisingly inaccurate, with errors ranging from misremembering minor details of 
events to generating illusory memories of entire episodes (Loftus, 1997). False memory, 
the phenomenon of remembering something that actually never occurred, has become a 
widely studied topic since its origins in Binet’s (1900) La Suggestibilité and Bartlett’s 
(1932) Remembering. The pervasiveness of such false memories generates an 
evolutionary puzzle; in the face of selection pressure for accuracy of memory (Dukas, 
1999, Mery, 2013, Raine and Chittka, 2008), how could such systematic failures have 
persisted over evolutionary time? As with perceptual illusions, false memories might be 
inevitable by-products of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes. In this chapter I 
explore whether individuals with a higher propensity to form false memories are better 
at other cognitive tasks, thus generating a trade-off by which certain cognitive capacities 
(in this case forming links between distinct memories, as in categorisation) cannot be 
achieved without the cost of memory inaccuracies.  
 
A plethora of experimental paradigms exist for eliciting differing types of false 
memories in declarative memory, i.e. people’s conscious memory for facts (Brainerd 
and Reyna, 2005). Episodic (and as such autobiographical) false memories are 
commonly elicited using the misinformation paradigm, in which information provided 
or questions asked after an event can bias memory (Loftus, 2005). Conversely, semantic 
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false memories can be elicited using the presentation of lists of semantically related 
words (Deese, 1959, Roediger and McDermott, 1995). The so called Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm has become widely used for exploring the malleability of 
memory. In this paradigm, participants begin by studying lists of words; for example a 
list may comprise the words mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, 
hatred, mean, calm, emotion, enrage. Each list is composed of the 15 strongest 
associates of one critically non-presented word, for example anger for the above list. 
Upon free recall of the lists or during a recognition test, the non-presented words are 
remembered at high rates and with high levels of confidence. This high proportion of 
false memories is attributed to the strength of the associations between the words 
presented in the lists and the words falsely remembered (Deese, 1959). 
 
While such tests might be viewed as rather remote from real-life situations in which the 
accuracy of memory matters, including episodic memories (DePrince et al., 2004, Freyd 
and Gleaves, 1996), it has recently been proposed that different types of false memories 
may share the same underlying mechanisms (Otgaar et al., 2012). These authors showed 
that children who generate a rich false memory when subjected to a typical false 
memory implantation paradigm, such as being led to believe they once took a ride in a 
hot air balloon (which in fact never occurred), are also more susceptible to false 
memories in a DRM test than children who do not develop a rich implanted false 
memory. Thus the DRM paradigm, artificial though it may seem, is a useful laboratory 





Clearly false memories cannot in themselves be useful, but like other memory 
inaccuracies (such as forgetting) they might be by-products of the otherwise adaptive 
nature of memory processes (Schacter, 1999, Schacter and Dodson, 2001, Schacter et 
al., 2011). But what cognitive processes might facilitate the generation of false 
memories as a by-product? It is possible that our abilities for rule learning, association 
and categorisation might come at a cost when it comes to memorising isolated facts, 
events, or indeed words. Specifically with respect to the semantic false memories tested 
in the DRM paradigm, errors might be produced by the ability of individuals to group 
words together, placing them in categories based on rules for membership. It therefore 
seems plausible that the creation of these semantic false memories may be a by-product 
of our ability to group words into categories. 
 
Categorising items is known to generate adaptive benefits such as the ability to learn 
information more quickly and to show greater efficiency during decision-making 
(Merritt et al., 2010), but McClelland (1995) argues that whilst such categorisation “is 
central to our ability to act intelligently” it however “gives rise to distortion as an 
inherent by-product” (p. 84). It is therefore possible that memory errors are an 
inevitable fluke of a powerful, adaptive cognitive phenomenon, in the case of semantic 
false memories our ability to learn rules and concepts, and to classify novel objects by 
category memberships (Carey, 2011, Chittka and Jensen, 2011). Indeed, categorisation 
is a strategy to economise on memory, since it allows recognising objects by a limited 
set of features that define the category, rather than memorising every single possible 




One possibility to explore the potential trade-off between categorisation ability and false 
memory susceptibility is to exploit variation between individuals, and to test whether 
superior performance on the one comes with increased error rates on the other. Inter-
individual variation is the raw material for evolution, and offers the possibility to 
quantify the fitness benefits of cognitive traits in natural settings (Raine and Chittka, 
2008) and to test potential trade-offs between one cognitive capacity and another (Raine 
and Chittka, 2012). Here I investigate a potential correlation between an individual’s 
proneness to semantic type false memories and their categorisation ability. For this 
purpose I subjected participants to a DRM paradigm to assess their semantic false 
memory susceptibility and a test consisting of verbal reasoning questions to assess their 
ability to form categories. My findings indicate that false memories, to some extent, 




5.2 Materials and methods 
The general method for eliciting false memories was based on Roediger and McDermott 
(1995) and Stadler et al. (1999). The protocol for the visual presentation of the wordlists 
was adapted from Peters et al. (2008). The categorisation test was constructed from 
educational aids published by Coordination Group Publications Ltd (Parsons, 2002b, a), 





 year undergraduate students from the School of Biological & Chemical 
Sciences, Queen Mary University of London participated in the study.  The participants 
were one full class undertaking a ‘statistics’ module and as such the experiment formed 
part of their learning, with a report writing task set from the results. Participant 
demographics were as follows: seven male, thirty-two female, aged nineteen to thirty 
years and of varying ethnicities. Full ethics approval was obtained from Queen Mary 
University of London Research Ethics Committee (Ref #0355) and all participants gave 
written consent of their acceptance to participate in the study. 
 
Materials 
To elicit the false memories, eighteen wordlists were used. Each wordlist consisted of 
the fifteen most commonly associated words of a critical non-presented word. For 
example the list mad, fear, hate, rage, temper, fury, ire, wrath, happy, fight, hatred, 
mean, calm, emotion, enrage is composed of the fifteen strongest associates of the word 
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anger and whilst the fifteen words in the list were shown to participants, the critical 
word anger was not. 
 
The wordlists were constructed using the first fifteen words listed in the Russell and 
Jenkins (1954) norms for the critical non-presented words (see Roediger and 
McDermott, 1995, Stadler et al., 1999 for full details of list construction). The eighteen 
wordlists were chosen for their known ability to elicit a high proportion of false 
memories during recall (Stadler et al., 1999). The eighteen critical non-presented words 
used (and their corresponding fifteen wordlists) were: Window, Sleep, Smell, Doctor, 
Sweet, Chair, Smoke, Rough, Needle, Anger, Trash, Soft, City, Cup, Cold, Mountain, 
Slow, River (Stadler et al., 1999).  
 
The wordlists were put into an automated computerised visual presentation in which 
each word was displayed in bold, black ‘Calibri Headings’ typeface, font size eighteen. 
Each word was displayed in the centre of a white screen at a rate of one second per 
word, with an inter-word interval of approximately five hundred milliseconds. To mark 
the start and end of a wordlist a white screen containing a black cross was displayed for 
one second. Following the end of each wordlist a blank white screen was displayed for 
two minutes. This coincided with the two minute free recall period (see below). The list 
order was randomised and the words within each list were presented in order of their 





The recognition test was comprised of one hundred and eight words randomly ordered 
in four columns of twenty-seven on a sheet of paper. The one hundred and eight words 
were those from serial positions one, eight, and ten of each of the eighteen studied lists, 
the eighteen critical lures, and thirty-six unrelated words not found in any of the 
eighteen lists. The thirty-six unrelated words were selected from the other eighteen 
word lists published in Stadler et al. (1999) and from the Oxford English Dictionary.  
The categorisation test consisted of forty-five printed questions. Each question consisted 
of five words, three of which were associated with one another and two of which were 
not. Participants were required to circle the two words that were not associated. An 
example of a question is as follows: 1. curve, arc, crouch, bend, medicine, where curve, 
arc and bend are the three words associated with one another and crouch and medicine 
are the words to be correctly circled. Source materials for the categorisation test were 
example verbal reasoning questions for UK 11+ exams (secondary school entry exams). 
Questions were reproduced with copyright permission from Coordination Group 




All participants were tested in one sitting. Participants were advised that they would be 
tested on their memory for lists of words and that they would be required to solve some 





Participants viewed the visual presentation containing the eighteen wordlists on a large 
screen. At the end of each list a two minute recall period was given. During these free 
recall periods, participants were instructed to write down as many of the words from the 
list they had just seen as they could remember. Participants were instructed not to guess, 
but to only write down words that they were reasonably sure they had seen. Participants 
were provided with a booklet in which to write down their responses.  
 
Participants then undertook the recognition test. They were instructed to carefully read 
the words on the sheet provided and to circle any words that they remembered being 
presented in the eighteen wordlists. Again participants were instructed not to guess but 
to only circle words they were reasonably sure they had seen. 
 
After the final recall period a ten minute break was given, but participants were 
instructed not to talk to each other about the study. Participants were then given seven 
minutes to work through the categorisation test. Again they were instructed not to guess, 
but to only answer those questions to whose answer they were reasonably sure of. Upon 










The number of critical non-presented words recalled (false memories), the number of 
critical non-presented words recognised (false memories), and the number of errors 
made on the categorisation test were calculated for each individual. These were also 
converted to give percentage errors (out of those possible to produce) to display 
graphically. Two Spearman’s rank correlations (Shapiro-Wilk normality test: p<0.001, 
skewness= 1.830, kurtosis=5.094 (leptokurtic distribution)) were used to look for a 
potential link between categorisation ability (categorisation test errors) and false 
memory susceptibility (recall and recognition errors). Additional correlations were used 
on subsets of the data to check for any biasing effects of priming, outliers and age. 
Finally, the numbers of recall, recognition and categorisation errors were compared 
between males and females using Wilcoxon rank sum tests to look for an effect of 












There were substantial inter-individual differences in both participants’ verbal 
categorisation abilities and their scores on a standardised false memory test. 
Categorisation errors ranged from 7% to 78% in different individuals, showing that 
even though the test we had chosen was originally designed for pre-teens, the task was 
sufficiently challenging for the tested population to capture a large range of inter-
individual variation (Fig. 5.1a). It was important to establish this since if all participants 
had had near-perfect scores (or indeed if all had had equally poor scores), the test would 
not have been suitable to correlate individual variation with other assessments of 
cognitive performance. 
 
Variation in individual false memory scores was likewise extensive. Recall false 
memory scores ranged from 0% to 78% of possible false memories made (Fig. 5.1b). 
Two individuals did not recall a single critical non-presented word and thus had a score 
of zero (and 0%) for recall false memories. Conversely three individuals recalled 
thirteen out of the possible eighteen false memories (and thus scored 72%), and one 
participant even scored fourteen (78%). Recognition false memory scores ranged from 
17% to 94% of possible false memories made (Fig. 5.1c). Five individuals recognised 
five or less of the critical non-presented words (and thus scored 28% or less), whilst 
eighteen individuals recognised thirteen or more out of the eighteen possible false 




Figure 5.1 Frequency histograms for a) the percentage of errors scored by individuals 
on the categorisation test, b) the percentage of false memories (out of those possible to 
elicit) recalled by individuals during the DRM paradigm and c) the percentage of false 
memories (out of those possible to elicit) recognised by individuals during the DRM 






I found a significant negative correlation between individuals’ categorisation error 
scores (given as the number of questions answered incorrectly on the categorisation test) 
and their false memory susceptibility during free recall (given as the number of critical 
non-presented words recalled) (rs=-0.345, df=37, p=0.032, Fig. 5.2a), thus those 
individuals scoring fewer errors on the categorisation test were more susceptible to false 
memory intrusions during free recall. In other words, participants that performed worse 
on the one test performed better on the other, and vice versa – indicating an inter-
individual trade-off between categorisation ability on the one hand and false memory 
susceptibility during free recall on the other. 
 
Likewise, I found a negative correlation between individuals’ categorisation error scores 
(given as the number of questions answered incorrectly on the categorisation test) and 
their false memory susceptibility during recognition (given as the number of critical 
non-presented words recognised), however this trend was not significant (rs=-0.202, 
df=37, p=0.219, Fig. 5.2b). Thus, again, the trend shows that those individuals scoring 













Figure 5.2 Individuals’ categorisation abilities (given as the percentage of questions 
answered incorrectly on the categorisation test) plotted against their susceptibilities to 
false memories (given as the percentage of critical non-presented words a) recalled and 
b) recognised, out of those possible). Those individuals scoring fewer errors on the 
categorisation test were more susceptible to false memory intrusions and 
correspondingly had a higher false memory score. 
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To exclude the possibility that any correlation could be caused by priming, the data 
were also analysed excluding those categorisation test questions that contained words 
previously presented in the wordlists, and non-presented as one of the critical non-
presented words. In our experiment for example, priming may have meant that the word 
eye presented as part of a question in the categorisation test: 41.  Eye    neck     nose    
mouth    shoulder, may have been preferentially selected as an answer due to its 
previous presentation in the word list associated with the critical non-presented word 
needle – thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn, hurt, 
injection, syringe, cloth, knitting. As such the scores for twelve questions were 
removed. A significant negative correlation was still found for free recall and a negative 
correlation still found for recognition; thus priming cannot account for the result (recall: 
rs=-0.362, df=37, p=0.024, recognition: rs=-0.206, df=37, p=0.208).  
 
Additionally, the removal of an outlier (a residuals vs. leverage plot showed a Cook’s 
distance greater than 0.5 for data point 24) did not change the statistical significance of 
the original result, thus it was not skewing the data unnecessarily in one direction and 
was therefore not the cause of the significant negative correlation found (recall: rs=-
0.341, df=36, p=0.036, recognition: rs=-0.175, df=36, p=0.293). 
 
The ages of the participants were not greatly varied, with thirty-six out of thirty-
nine participants aged nineteen to twenty-one, one participant aged twenty-three, one 
participant aged thirty and one participant not stating their age. The removal of the data 
for the participant aged thirty did not change the statistical significance of the original 
result, thus the greater age of this participant in comparison to the others was also not 
the cause of the significant negative correlation found (recall: rs=-0.387, df=36, 
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p=0.016, recognition: rs=-0.251, df=36, p=0.129). Furthermore, the imbalance in the 
number of male and female participants (seven male, thirty-two female) is unlikely to 
have caused any bias in the data as there was no significant difference found between 
the two genders in the mean values for the recall errors (Wilcoxon rank sum test: 
W=114, p=0.956), recognition errors (Wilcoxon rank sum test: W=97.5, p=0.605) nor 
the categorisation test scores (Wilcoxon rank sum test: =102, p=0.727). Finally, the 
ethnicities of the participants were not taken into account when analysing the data due 
to inconsistencies in the responses received. Several participants failed to provide any 
information pertaining to their ethnicity, and many more provided details comprising of 
three different ethnic components. As such it was impossible to either elucidate which 















My findings show a trade-off between word categorisation ability and semantic false 
memory susceptibility, so that individuals that make more errors on the false memory 
test make fewer errors on the categorisation test, and vice versa. Thus my results cannot 
simply be explained by differences in level of education, literacy, vocabulary or 
intelligence. If such an underlying factor would have explained performance on both 
tasks, then superior performance on one task would have been a predictor of superior 
performance on the other task. For example, short term memorisation of word lists 
recruits working memory, which is often regarded as a general predictor of intelligence 
(Oberauer et al., 2005, Oberauer et al., 2008) and likewise the categorisation tests used 
here are typical components of standardised intelligence tests (Wechsler, 2004, 2008). 
Thus one might have predicted a positive correlation of error scores in both tasks if an 
underlying single factor such as intelligence would explain the data. However, the 
correlation of error scores in the two measured tasks was negative. Thus even though 
this study is clearly correlative in nature, and therefore does not allow me to conclude 
with certainty that the two performances are based on the same underlying mechanisms, 
it is intriguing that having a lower tendency to generate false memories comes at a cost, 
i.e. lower categorisation scores.  
 
To date the majority of scholars interested in false memories have focused on factors 
which may exacerbate or reduce the occurrence of such memory errors (Dodson et al., 
2000). The adaptive nature of the human memory system as a potential reason for the 
occurrence false memories has been suggested (Schacter, 1999, Schacter, 2001), yet the 
ultimate reasons for their existence has been infrequently explored empirically. More 
recently, however, evidence has grown for links between individuals’ differing 
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susceptibilities to false memories and their variations in a range of cognitive features. 
False recall and/or recognition rates in a DRM paradigm have been shown to vary with 
individuals’ variations in levels of vivid mental imagery (Winograd et al., 1998), 
specific area expertise (Baird, 2003, Castel et al., 2007), working memory capacity 
(Watson et al., 2005) and need for cognition (Graham, 2007).  
 
Additionally it has been shown that when survival-related (i.e. evolutionarily relevant) 
information is used in a list-learning paradigm, increased susceptibility to false 
memories occurs. Howe and Derbish (2010) found that when participants are asked to 
process words for their survival value and when the words presented were themselves 
survival relevant (i.e., ‘death: burial, casket, cemetery, funeral, grave, life, murder, 
suicide, tragedy, widow), veridical and false recognition were significantly higher 
(leading to an overall decrease in net accuracy) than when the words viewed were 
neutral or negative and were processed for pleasantness. They concluded that whilst it 
does not at first seem adaptive for survival-related memories to be less accurate and in 
fact be more prone to false intrusions than other types of memory, it does make sense if 
considered as a by-product of the adaptive processing of information related to survival. 
They argue that during the processing of information related to survival, any related 
information in memory is then primed, which may or may not be false, but that this 
information is then used to guide attention to other survival-related items, which may be 





It has even been postulated that this greater inaccuracy may actually have adaptive 
significance, being more helpful in real-world scenarios. For example, in responses to 
predation threat, false alarms, such as generalising to a large set of cues that might 
indicate predator presence are clearly less detrimental errors than missing predator 
presence based on interpreting predators’ cues too narrowly (Howe and Derbish, 2010). 
Thus my finding of a significant positive correlation between susceptibility to semantic 
false memories in a free recall DRM paradigm and word-based categorisation ability, 
with the creation of these errors a by-product of our ability to group words, is in keeping 
with recent findings.   
 
The population from which the subjects for this study were drawn is ethnically and 
culturally diverse. As a result some may argue that a small number of the words 
presented in the study, which was constructed from American and British materials may 
have had different meanings to some of the participants. One example is the non-
presented critical word needle and one of its corresponding associates haystack. Whilst 
participants with a western cultural background would have been expected to connect 
the two words due to the use of the famous saying needle in a haystack, participants 
with Chinese heritage may not have as it is known that the saying is largely unknown in 
China (Lee et al., 2008). I would argue however that as all participants were studying 
for an undergraduate university degree taught only in English, any non-native 
participants, potentially with a different primary language would have had to have met a 
minimum requirement for English language comprehension dictated by one of three 
internationally renowned assessors (IELTS, IBTOEFL or PTE Academic) to be granted 
a place at the university. This would at least have partially negated any potential non-
comprehension of the words used. Additionally no other previous DRM-based studies 
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have looked at the potential effects of ethnicity on semantic false memory production. I 
was unable to include this variable in the analysis due to the inconsistencies in the 
responses given by the participants. In order for this variable to be analysed in any 
future studies it may be prudent to provide participants with pre-set ethnicity categories 
to place themselves into.  
 
Whilst the age range of the subjects tested was narrow (nineteen to twenty-one years old 
in the majority) many of the key studies using the DRM paradigm have used only 
participants also of average undergraduate college study age (Roediger and McDermott, 
1995, Stadler et al., 1999). Additionally the only significant difference in spontaneous 
false memory creation, caused by the DRM paradigm that is known to occur between 
participants of different ages, is between children and adults. Several studies have 
shown that children are less prone to these memory errors, with an increase in their 
propensity occurring during both childhood and early adolescence (Brainerd et al., 
2002, Brainerd et al., 2004, Forrest, 2002) . As such, inferences made from my findings 
are not just applicable to young adults but should also be to the ‘average’ adult 
population as a whole. 
 
My result of a significant negative correlation between individuals’ errors on a 
categorisation test and their susceptibilities to semantic type false memories during free 
recall demonstrates that false memories, to some extent, might be a by-product of our 
ability to learn rules, categories and concepts. For example, once we have learnt the 
concept/category of mammals, we can identify new animals as members of this category 
even if we have never seen them before. In this case, labelling the new animal as 
mammal is not based on false classification, but a correct one based on category 
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membership: the simple flipside of the DRM paradigm, where inferences based on 
concepts and categories are classed as errors. Thus, my findings add to the increasing 
body of literature that proposes that false memories might be an inevitable by-product 
of adaptive cognitive processes as is the case with other memory aberrations (Abbott 




Chapter 6: General Discussion 
6.1 Summary of Chapters 
It has long been known that human memory is surprisingly fallible, with errors ranging 
from the incorrect recall or recognition of simple words (Deese, 1959, Roediger and 
McDermott, 1995) to the insertion of current beliefs and stereotypes into a 
‘remembered’ scenario (Bartlett, 1932), to the false ‘remembering’ of entire 
autobiographical events (Loftus, 1975, Loftus, 1993). Recently, the known 
transgressions of human memory have been re-classified into seven types, with a 
comparison made to the seven sins of the bible (Schacter, 1999, 2001). Further to the re-
classification it has been proposed that whilst these ‘memories’ are obviously 
erroneous, they may not be the evolutionary paradox they that they appear. Schacter 
(1999, 2001)  insinuates that these errors are in fact the inevitable by-products of our 
adaptive memory processes. However, to date the majority of research has focused 
primarily on the formation and incidence of these errors in human memory, with only a 
few studies looking into the potential occurrence of such errors in non-human animal 
species (Harper and Garry, 2000, Schwartz et al., 2004). 
 
The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate whether two species of social 
insects are also susceptible to the types of false memory errors known in humans. 
Additionally I have discussed the potential scope for the use of animal models in the 
study of false memories. Using the bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the honeybee Apis 
mellifera, the preceding chapters have explored how the memory of pollinating insects 
may be effected by an innate preference (similar to known biases/stereotypes), multiple 
memory traces and postevent cues (akin to misinformation). I have also examined the 
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potential relationship between an adaptive cognitive process (categorisation), utilised 
for memory efficiency and the formation of semantic type false memories as elicited by 
the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. My investigations have explored, on 
both bees and human subjects, the adaptive perspective on false memories proposed by 
Schacter (1999, 2001). The data presented in my dissertation imply that a pollinating 
insect may be susceptible to at least one type of memory error that humans are: the 
memory conjunction error, but that the methodological changes required and the 
potential differing learning and memory processes utilised, may make animal models, or 
in this specific case pollinating insect species unsuitable for the study of some specific 
memory errors, such as those created by pre-existing beliefs/biases about the world, and 
to some extent the influence of misinformation. Additionally, a relationship does exist 
between an adaptive cognitive process and a known human memory error, more 
specifically our ability to categorise and the semantic errors created by the (DRM) 
paradigm. This lends weight to the adaptive perspective argument.     
 
6.11 Memory fallibility in bees 
Despite the lack of literature on the susceptibility of non-human animals to known 
human memory errors, the small amount of work undertaken has revealed perhaps 
surprisingly analogous results, with the pigeon Columba livia (Harper and Garry, 2000), 
the rat Rattus norvegicus (Garry and Harper, 2009) and a gorilla Gorilla gorilla gorilla 
(Schwartz et al., 2004) all being shown to be biased by postevent cues, akin to 
misinformation. The potential occurrence of false memories in pollinating insect species 




In Chapter 2 I found that the innate preference for bilateral symmetry in the bumblebee 
Bombus terrestris, akin to a bias/stereotype in humans (Banaji and Bhaskar, 2000, 
Bartlett, 1932), does not influence memory degradation in the way in which pre-existing 
thoughts about the world directionally alter human memory. Memory simply weakened 
over time, such that three days post training all possible artificial flowers were chosen 
with roughly equal frequencies, rather than the flower containing the innate preference 
(bilateral symmetry) being chosen at a higher frequency.  
 
In Chapter 3 I found that the bumblebee Bombus terrestris, when utilising long-term 
memory commits a ‘merging’ error akin to the memory conjunction error known to 
occur in humans (Reinitz et al., 1992). Twenty-four hours after learning first a black and 
white pattern, then a colour, bees erroneously chose a hybrid flower that comprised a 
combination of the two learnt visual features: colour and pattern. This is, to my 
knowledge the first example of memory ‘merging’ in a non-human animal. 
 
In Chapter 4 I explored the potential for the effect of ‘misinformation’ in two further 
non-human animal species: the bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the honeybee. My 
findings indicate that neither species is susceptible to the ‘misinformation effect’ in the 
way that humans (Loftus and Palmer, 1974, McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985), pigeons 
(Harper and Garry, 2000), rats (Garry and Harper, 2009) and a gorilla are (Schwartz et 
al., 2004), with memory retention for original colour information remaining high 
regardless of the type of postevent cue used. However, my findings also highlight 
important methodological issues with using these pollinating insect species to study this 
type of memory error. 
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 6.12 Human false memories: semantic errors and categorisation ability 
Chapter 5 investigated the potential adaptive perspective argument of false memories, as 
postulated by Schacter (Schacter, 1999, 2001). I found a trade-off between word 
categorisation ability and semantic false memory susceptibility, such that individuals 
who made fewer errors on a categorisation test, made more errors on a false memory 
test, and vice versa. Whilst only correlative in nature, my results lend weight to the 
argument that misattribution errors of which the semantic errors elicited using the DRM 
paradigm are, are inevitable by-products of our adaptive cognitive ability to generalise, 





6.2 Bees as a model for memory errors? 
Bees have been extensively used as model systems to study learning and memory 
(Giurfa, 2003, Menzel, 1968, 1969, Menzel and Giurfa, 2001, Von Frisch, 1967), with 
much in the literature regarding the capabilities of both honeybees and bumblebees. 
Many bee species are known to utilise similar cognitive abilities to those proposed to 
cause a variety of memory errors in humans (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012, Dukas, 
1995, Rodriguez et al., 2004, Zhang et al., 2004). As a result this thesis used the 
bumblebee Bombus terrestris and the honeybee Apis mellifera to explore the potential 
use of bees as animal models for the study of known memory errors. 
 
In humans preferences, biases and stereotypes are known to cause ‘bias’ errors in 
declarative memory, such that memories are subconsciously ‘altered’ to fit in with the 
subjects’ pre-existing beliefs about the world (Bartlett, 1932). It is thought that this type 
of error could be caused by our ability to generalise, e.g. our ability to group people and 
or objects based on past experiences (Schacter, 1999), to economise memory so that 
items or events may be remembered based on just a few rules rather than a large number 
of specific details (Chittka and Niven, 2009). The bumblebee Bombus terrestris is 
known to have an innate preference for bilateral symmetry (Rodriguez et al., 2004), 
with naive individuals preferentially choosing bilaterally symmetric black and white 
patterned artificial flowers when given the choice between those and asymmetric ones 
(Rodriguez et al., 2004). Additionally honeybees can detect and generalise symmetry 
and asymmetry (Giurfa et al., 1996), with bees trained to discriminate bilaterally 
symmetric from asymmetric patterns both successfully learning the task, and also 
transferring the learnt cues to novel artificial flowers (Giurfa et al., 1996, Giurfa and 
Menzel, 1997). Thus, as bees are capable of generalisation they and show an innate 
145 
 
preference, which may be considered akin to a bias or preference shown by humans, 
they were considered potentially suitable for use as non-human models for the study of 
such a memory error.  
 
However the bumblebee Bombus terrestris showed no such memory error, with no 
effect of the innate preference for symmetry seen on memory degradation. Both those 
bees trained to a bilaterally symmetrical artificial flower and those trained to an 
asymmetrical flower showed a general decrease in memory retention over time, with all 
artificial flower types being chosen at around chance levels three days after training. 
Whilst there is some evidence that methodologies adapted from human false memory 
studies for use with non-human animals produce results that are comparable (Garry and 
Harper, 2009), the method used in my study differed vastly from that used for humans 
(Bartlett, 1932). Many of the classic human false memory studies (Loftus and Palmer, 
1974, Roediger and McDermott, 1995), such as the one this experiment was based on 
(Bartlett, 1932) rely on verbal communication which is potentially why so few have 
been successfully adapted for work in non-human animals. Additionally, it could be 
argued that the innate preference for bilateral symmetry is not truly akin to a bias, 
preference or stereotype in humans, as it is innate and not learnt. As such bumblebees 
may not be suitable for studying this type of memory error.      
 
Given that previous studies of known human memory errors in non-human animal 
species have focused on postevent cues (akin to misinformation, in which secondary 
information biases an existing memory) inserted into delayed matching-to-sample 
(DMTS) tasks (Garry and Harper, 2009, Harper and Garry, 2000, Schwartz et al., 2004), 
this thesis investigated whether bees would make ideal candidates for the study of the 
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effect of postevent cues (‘misinformation’) in an animal model. Bees have shown the 
pre-requisite cognitive requirements to be utilised in such a study, more specifically the 
ability to utilise non-elemental learning, in which knowledge as to the relationship 
between objects, rather than the specific physical features of the objects is needed to 
solve a task (Dale et al., 2005, Giurfa et al., 2001). Honeybees can successfully learn 
both DMTS tasks and delayed non-matching-to-sample (DNMTS) tasks using both 
solid colours and horizontal or vertical striped patterns, with the ability to transfer these 
concepts between the sensory modalities of olfaction and vision (Giurfa et al., 2001). 
Bumblebees have also shown some ability to learn a colour-based DMTS task, but only 
if spatial cues were also available to find the rewarded colour (Dale et al., 2005). It has 
been inferred that ‘misinformation’ causes declarative memory errors due to our 
inability to correctly attribute memories to their original source (Schacter and Dodson, 
2001). In turn this error type could therefore be considered as an unwanted by-product 
of our ability to group things together, for example by generalising or categorising, 
which allows a large amount of information to be stored and retrieved, using only a 
small number of presented exemplars (Chittka and Niven, 2009, Schacter, 1999). 
Honeybees can categorise objects based on general features, such as ‘landscapes’, ‘plant 
stems’ and ‘flower types’ (Zhang et al., 2004) and can utilise olfactory (Wright et al., 
2008) and number-based visual generalisations (Gross et al., 2009). Additionally the 
bumblebee Bombus terrestris is known to generalise to colours after learning, such that 
those test colours most similar in colour to the learnt colour are chosen with the greatest 





However, again, bees showed no memory error, which is inconsistent with both the 
literature on the ‘misinformation effect’ in humans (Loftus and Palmer, 1974, Loftus, 
1975) and the effect of postevent cues on other non-human animal species (Garry and 
Harper, 2009, Harper and Garry, 2000, Schwartz et al., 2004). In both the honeybee and 
the bumblebee Bombus terrestris memory retention was not affected by postevent cues, 
such that bees that successfully learnt the three-colour DMTS task continued to show 
high levels of memory accuracy for the sample regardless of the type of postevent that 
was inserted at the end of the delay. Additionally, due to methodological issues, the 
sample sizes obtained were low. Furthermore bumblebees showed significant side 
biases, which appeared to be innate, rather than learnt and as such may be akin to 
‘handedness’ in humans (Goulson et al., 2013, Kells and Goulson, 2001). Three species 
of bumblebee (Bombus lapidarius, Bombus lucorum and Bombus pascuorum) have 
previously been shown to exhibit such behaviour (Kells and Goulson, 2001). Thus 
bumblebees may not be a suitable model system for the study of ‘misinformation’ 
which if adapting protocols from other non-human animal studies involves the use of a 
spatially separated maze-based paradigm. Additionally honeybees may not have 
actually been successfully learning the DMTS task in its truest sense. In a traditional 
bee DMTS paradigm the sample is always presented at a fixed distance along the 
tunnel. As such Zhang et al. (2005) proposed that honeybees are simply learning to 
attend to whatever is at that fixed distance as opposed to really learning the concept of 
the task – to remember what the sample is, no matter what it is, as long as it is the first 
‘item’ encountered. They found that after training to fixed distance samples, if the 
distance of the sample was then varied during the test, bees’ memory retention was 
severely affected and choices for the correct comparison flowers fell to chance level. 
Therefore honeybees may also not be suitable for the study of the effect of 
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‘misinformation’, or at least not without significant alterations being made to the 
existing protocols. 
 
The memory conjunction error, in which memories for multiple items are combined to 
create a hybrid ‘memory’, occurs for words, sentences and pictures of faces in humans 
(Reinitz et al., 1992, Reinitz and Demb, 1994). It is thought that this type of error may 
be caused by a retrieval error in which ‘memories’ are recalled based on a feeling of 
familiarity, rather than from identifying specific features (Rubin et al., 1999). In turn 
this may be due to our ability to gain storage and retrieval efficiency by generalising 
and/or categorising (McClelland, 1995). The bumblebee Bombus occidentalis has been 
shown to be capable of both simultaneously holding and alternately retrieving memories 
for two different colours in order to solve two separately presented colour choice tasks 
(Dukas, 1995). Additionally, the honeybee can simultaneously utilise two concepts, 
such that both an abstract involving spatial relationships: either above/below or 
left/right, and an abstract concept involving the perception of difference can not only be 
learnt, but also successfully transferred as a dual-concept to correctly locate unknown 
targets that are the best match of both concepts: the learnt spatial relationship and those 
different from one another (Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012). Furthermore, interference, in 
which multiple memory traces interfere with one another, has been shown to occur in 
several bumblebee species. Retroactive interference, in which newly learnt information 
impedes the recall of prior learnt information (Müller and Pilzecker, 1900), effects the 
sensorimotor memories of flower handling in Bombus impatiens (Chittka and Thomson, 
1997, Gegear and Laverty, 1995) and Bombus bimaculatus (Woodward and Laverty, 
1992), and colour memory in Bombus occidentalis (Dukas, 1995). As previously 
mentioned, several bee species are capable of generalising (Bombus pascorum, Bombus 
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vtteranus, Bombus urratris, Bombus lapidarius; Chittka et al., 1997, Apis mellifera; 
Giurfa et al., 1996, Wright et al., 2008), categorising (Apis mellifera; Dukas and Waser, 
1994, Bombus flavifrons; Zhang et al., 2004) and even forming concepts (Apis 
mellifera; Avarguès-Weber et al., 2012), Thus, again bees were considered a potentially 
good model to investigate a known human memory error, in this case an error specific 
to the integration of multiple memories.  
 
The bumblebee Bombus terrestris was indeed found to commit this type of memory 
error. When required to utilise long-term memory for multiple visual targets that were 
previously rewarded bees committed an error in which information from multiple 
memory traces ‘merged’. Bees initially trained to a black and white concentric circle 
pattern and then a solid yellow colour preferentially chose an artificial flower comprised 
of components of both training flowers: yellow and white concentric circle pattern, 
twenty-four hours post training. This is, to my knowledge, the first example of this 
known human memory error occurring in a non-human animal species. 
 
It therefore appears that differences in learning and memory processes utilised by bees 
when undertaking the classic DRM paradigm in comparison to both humans (Garry and 
Harper, 2009) and the non-human animal species the pigeon (Harper and Garry, 2000), 
rat (Garry and Harper, 2009) and gorilla (Schwartz et al., 2004), combined with the 
known problem of adapting verbal-based human methodologies for use in non-human 
animal species, may make bees unsuitable animal models for the study of known human 
memory errors. However, this thesis has reported, for the first time in a non-human 
animal, a memory ‘merging’ error akin to the memory conjunction error shown by 
humans (Reinitz et al., 1992). Thus bees may still be suitable for the study of certain 
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human memory errors. What is clear is that the learning and memory processes utilised 
by bees in cognitive tasks need to be thoroughly considered when both designing new 




6.3 Memory errors: An adaptive perspective? 
Schacter (1999, 2001) has proposed that whilst memory errors may seem maladaptive, 
they may in fact be the inevitable by-products of the many adaptive features of human 
memory. One common type of memory error is the semantic memory error, 
experimentally elicited using the DRM paradigm. In this paradigm, participants study 
lists of words each comprising of associates of one critically non-presented word. 
During subsequent recall or recognition of the wordlists, the critically non-presented 
words are remembered both with high frequency and with high levels of confidence. 
The high proportion of false memories produced is attributed to the strength of the 
associations between the words actually presented and the words falsely remembered 
(and thus, critically non-presented) (Deese, 1959). Under Schacter’s (1999, 2001) recent 
re-classification or memory errors, these semantic false memories fall under the 
category  ‘Misattribution’ and as such are thought to occur due to assigning information 
to the incorrect source. In turn it is thought that they may be caused by our ability to 
generalise and form categories and concepts (Schacter, 1999, 2001). Categorising is 
adaptive as it economises memory, allowing us to both store and recall a large amount 
of information based on just a few criteria (Chittka and Jensen, 2011). However, as a 
result we may occasionally erroneously ‘remember’ members of a category, as although 
they were not actually presented themselves they were thought of when their exemplars 
were presented (McClelland, 1995). Thus, my finding of a correlation between 
individuals’ susceptibility to semantic false memories elicited by the DRM paradigm 
and their categorisation ability lends weight to Schacter’s (1999, 2001) theory. 
Individuals that made more errors on the false memory task made fewer errors on the 
categorisation test, and vice versa. My results therefore add evidence to support the 
increasing that postulates that false memories may be inevitable by-products of adaptive 
cognitive processes.   
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6.4 Improvements and future work. 
The mixed results reported in this thesis give rise to the potential for both improvements 
of the existing work and further experiments that may build upon the work set out here: 
 
As previously stated it could be argued that the innate preference for symmetry in 
bumblebees is not completely akin to a human bias, preference or stereotype and as 
such the results reported in Chapter 2 may not be sufficient to form a firm conclusion as 
to whether bees memories' are affected by this types of error, as human memory is. In 
humans biases, preferences and stereotypes tend to be learnt rather than innate, even if 
they are somewhat subconsciously learnt, simply through observation and imitation, 
rather than actively learnt, through more direct experience (Mackie et al., 1996). 
Therefore there is perhaps scope to repeat the experiments in Chapter 2 using a learnt 
preference (i.e. bees previously trained to prefer a set colour/pattern/orientation), rather 
than an innate preference, as this may be more similar to human bias. 
 
Additionally, the experiments reported in Chapter 4 did not generate sufficient data for 
analysis. It appears that the bumblebee Bombus terrestris is incapable of learning the 
traditional DMTS paradigm, potentially due to side biases akin to handedness in 
humans (Kells and Goulson, 2001). This would make it virtually impossible to repeat 
the experiment in order to gain more data. Upon consultation with a colleague I was 
informed that bumblebees have been successfully trained to a two-colour DMTS using a 
modified arena (Schumacher, 2010), but I was not able to replicate their results. On the 
other hand the honeybee data could easily be extended upon, as the protocol worked 
well, but was simply limited by the weather conditions. As such more data could easily 
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be generated when weather conditions were more optimal (i.e. hot, with little wind), to 
confirm the tentative results found in this thesis. However my results showed that 
although honeybees do not appear to be effected by postevent cues, in the way in which 
humans are by misinformation, this may actually be due to both the way in which 
honeybees learn the DMTS task and the experimental design. Bees may simply have 
been remembering what was presented at a fixed distance, rather than what was 
specifically presented (Zhang et al., 2005), thus in order to truly test for any effect of 
postevent cues on memory, the honeybee experiment in Chapter 4 would need to be 
repeated, but using a DMTS task in which the sample distance was varied, in order to 
prevent the learning of a distance and promote a more general learning of the overall 
concept/rule: to remember the sample seen before the delay period.  
 
Again, it is apparent that the learning and memory processes utilised by bees in 
undertaking cognitive tasks need to be well understood when designing protocols to 
both improve and extend any work reported in this thesis. 
 
Furthermore, whilst my finding in humans of a correlation between an adaptive 
cognitive ability: categorisation, and a known type of memory error: semantic false 
memories elicited by the DRM paradigm lends weight to Schacter’s (1999, 2001) theory 
that memory errors are the inevitable by-products of our adaptive cognitive processes, it 
would be interesting to see widely this correlation holds true. The experiment in 
Chapter 5 could be extended to investigate different types of categorisation ability, i.e 
non-verbal (pictoral), and include alterations to the modalities of delivery of the two 





The work presented and reviewed in this thesis illustrates that a pollinating insect is to 
some extent susceptible to the types of errors known from studies of human memory. It 
presents the first example of a memory merging error, akin to the memory conjunction 
error in non-human animal species. However, my dissertation also highlights the 
potential difficulties in adapting known and successful methodologies for use with 
different species. Furthermore false memories may not be quite the evolutionary 
paradox they first appear to be, but might in fact be the inevitable by-products of our 
adaptive cognitive abilities that on the whole enable the intricacies and efficiencies 
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